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LAWYERS' ETHICS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
IN THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF AGGREGATIVE LITIGATION
LESTER BRICKMAN
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several decades and at a quickening pace, we have
seen the rise of the mass tort phenomenon.' The term mass tort refers to
an allegation of injury by large numbers of persons due to a calamity or
exposure to defectively produced foods, drugs, products implanted in the
body, or improperly designed or constructed vehicles, other products,
materials or structures, which is sought to be redressed by combining
(aggregating) large numbers of claims sharing like issues of fact and law
2
into a litigation against one or more defendants using such structural
aggregative methods as class actions, consolidations, and other techniques.
Some mass torts are not a result of personal physical injury, but
rather economic injury.3 Typically, the injury to each claimant is small,
but in the aggregate, the injury alleged is substantial. In actions based
upon fraud, allegations are made that a bank, insurance company, credit
Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law of Yeshiva University.
See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND THE WORKING GROUP ON MASS TORTS
TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES AND TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION 9 et seq. (Feb. 15, 1999); see also
John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM.
L. REV. 1343, 1344-45 (1995). Class action litigation, for example, has increased
dramatically since the 1980s, with most of the increases taking place in state courts. A
survey done by the Federalist Society found that between 1988 and 1998 class actions
increased by 338% in federal courts while the increase in state courts was more than
1000%. Analysis: Class Action Litigation-A Federalist Society Survey, CLASS ACTION
WATCH 3, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1999).
2 "[S]imilar factual issues and legal questions will arise in all claims in a mass tort
litigation, or at least in a significant subset of claims. The same injuries will involve
similar causation issues. Liability issues will be similar among claims alleging similar
exposures to a particular defendant's products." Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A.
Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59
BROOK. L. REV. 961, 966 (1993).
3 For an account of several class actions based upon economic injury, see DEBORAH
HENSLER ET AL, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING
PuBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 139 (2000).
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issuer, airline or other goods seller or service provider, in the course of
selling the service or product, defrauded thousands or even hundreds of
thousands of consumers. While such actions, if brought individually,
would usually be denominated as breach of contract suits, and attempts to
convert the claims into tort actions would usually be rejected by courts, 4
the sorcerer's elixir of aggregation magically transforms them into tort
claims replete with demands for punitive damages.
Changes in social and legal trends in recent decades have
facilitated the rise of the mass tort phenomenon. 5 Among these trends are
increases in product marketing that have led to mass consumption of
goods and services and therefore greater exposure to their potentially
dangerous effects, advances in medical technology that enable doctors to
connect injury with exposure to products or chemical substances,
epidemiological studies, increased mass media reporting of potentially
dangerous products or circumstances including the increased role of
television journalism shows-productions that are sometimes assisted by
lawyers who are financially interested in sensationalizing coverage of an
issue in order to affect public opinion or generate a client base. Increased
litigation activity is also facilitated by widespread solicitation of potential
claimants by use of mass advertising, "800" phone numbers, and websites;
close association with union officials in a position to steer large numbers
of claimants to specific lawyers; the formation of victim support groups
that are overtly or surreptitiously underwritten by lawyers; 6 the formation
of networks of lawyers specialized to particular product claims; 7 rising
4 Attempts to convert a cause of action for breach of contract under state law into an
action for fraud usually fail. See, e.g., Richard A. Wagner, When Contract Claims and
Fraud Claims Intersect, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17,1999, at 1.
5Hensler & Peterson, supra note 2, at 1013-14.
6 See Michael Moss, Plaintiffs' Attorneys Back Groups that Help Nursing Home
Residents, WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1999, at I (indicating that persons calling a toll-free
number expecting to reach an independent nursing-home advocacy group that fields
complaints about nursing homes and lobbies for better treatment of elderly residents are
instead first connected to a law firm which pays for the toll-free line and associated web
sites; other lawyers provide direct financial support of similar advocacy groups). The
article indicates that these undertakings by lawyers are shrouded in secrecy. Id.
7See Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 2001, at 114 (reporting
on pleading and strategy sharing on websites and sales of litigation packets with step-by-
step instructions for filing products liability lawsuits); Steven Keeva, No Deficit of
Attention Here. Ritalin Class Action Suits are Making Some Drug Companies Hyper,
A.B.A.J., June 2001, at 28, 30 (June 2001) (quoting high-profile plaintiffs' lawyers on
their attempts to structure multiple massive tort suits like "joint ventures," allocating work
to different plaintiffs' firms around the country to avoid "duplication of effort"). For an
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corporate wealth; judicial decisions maximizing insurance coverage; and
procedural rules that facilitate litigation against, manufacturers.
8
However, the single most important factor accounting for the rise
of the mass tort claim in recent decades is the enormous financial
incentives that lawyers have structured and courts have condoned for
bringing aggregative actions.9 Plaintiff lawyers, charging contingency
fees, are able to earn substantial, indeed enormous, fees which are not
commensurate with either the effort required, the risks assumed, 10 or
account of the coordination between lawyers involved in gun litigation which is described
as exceeding that in the tobacco litigation, see Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott,
Note, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity Tobacco and Gun
Litigation, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 549, 598-99 (2000).
8 Hensler & Peterson, supra note 2, at 1013-30.
9 Judith Resnick et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation
and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 296, 300 (1996) (the economic benefits to lawyers of
large-scale litigation are well documented); see also Charles C. Wolfram, Mass Torts-
Messy Ethics, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1228, 1231 (1995) (stating "the class-action plaintiffs'
bar is driven by... easy money-a great deal of it").
10 The thesis that very high fees are being routinely obtained in contingency fee cases
without meaningful risk, yielding what I have termed "windfall fees," is one that I have
previously advanced. See Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees:
Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 247, 280 n.112 (1996); Lester
Brickman, Contingent Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29, 92-93 (1989); see also Derek Bok, THE COST OF
TALENT: How EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS
AMERICA 140 (Free Press 1993) (noting that most plaintiffs do not know whether they
have a strong case, and rare is the lawyer who will inform them (and agree to a lower
percentage of the take) when they happen to have an extremely high probability of
winning. In most instances, therefore, the contingent fee is a standard rate that seldom
varies with the size of a likely settlement or the odds of prevailing in court.).
A particularly illustrative example of price gouging in a mass tort context occurs
in asbestos litigation. When asbestos litigation first commenced in the early 1970s,
contingency fees of 40% were common. This was a reflection of the high degree of risk
posed by such litigation. But when Borel v. Fibreboard Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), was decided, the risk equation changed
considerably. By the mid-1980s, plaintiffs' lawyers had retooled their cases to reflect the
Johns-Manville bankruptcy and the consequent need to perfect cases against thirty or so
heretofore peripheral players. By then the risk in asbestos cases had shifted dramatically.
Had lawyers' fees been responsive to market conditions, the contingency fee percentages
would have dropped considerably to reflect the sea change that had occurred in the risk
equation. It is a tribute to the power of the asbestos bar that contingency fees have
remained at the extremely high levels that were set when litigation risks were considerable
even though most claims today are settled through an essentially administrative process in
batches of hundreds, thousands, and even tens of thousands with little or no lawyer time
devoted to most of them and with effective hourly fees being generated ranging from
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ethical limitations on the reasonableness of fees." These fees frequently
amount to thousands and tens of thousands of dollars an hour and even as
much as hundreds of thousands of dollars an hour. In addition, by
aggregating claims, lawyers gain enormous bargaining power, which
enables them to extract settlements usually without the need for trial. For
these reasons, lawyers are constantly searching out opportunities to initiate
mass tort litigations.
Aggregative litigation provides for economies of scale that can
improve judicial efficiency, especially by reducing repetitive litigation.
However, at the same time, aggregative litigation may result in sacrificing
both procedural and substantive fairness, or produce perverse effects or
other undesirable results.12  For these reasons, the increasing use of
aggregative litigation mechanisms have led to calls for Congress to create
administrative mechanisms for dealing with certain types of mass torts,
especially asbestos litigation. However, the plaintiffs' bar, exercising
considerable if not overwhelming political power, has successfully
countered such efforts. 13  In the face of congressional failure to create
$5,000 to $25,000. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There A
Need for An Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REv.1819, 1834 n.60 (1992)
[hereinafter Brickman, Asbestos Litigation].
I The rules of ethics require that attorneys' fees be reasonable. See MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(a)
(1980). In fact, an ordinary lawyer has a duty to reject a compromise providing generous
fees but modest relief for the client. Paul C. Carrington ,& Derek P. Apanovitch, The
Constitutional Limits of Judicial Rulemaking: The Illegitimacy of Mass Tort Settlements
Negotiated Under Federal Rule 23, 39 ARIz. L. REv. 461, 468 (1997) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 206, cmt. F (1998)).
12 See Edith H. Jones, Rough Justice in Mass Future Claims: Should Bankruptcy Courts
Direct Tort Reform?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1695, 1696-97 (1998) ("A defendant's liability,
which should be a critical factor in the fashioning of a just solution, becomes submerged
beneath the overwhelming volume of claims and the huge transactional costs of defending
them.").
13 While Congress (and the states) may "make no law . .. abridging the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances
.... " U.S. CONST., amend. I, such a prohibition does not extend to plaintiffs' lawyers.
Consider, for example, the asbestos bar, which exercises enormous power as evidenced
by the means they have used to oppose proposed legislation to create an administrative
alternative to asbestos litigation that would limit compensation to only those with actual
injury, essentially as per the terms of the Amchem settlement, and then according to a
specific schedule. See Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong.
(1999); S.758, 106th Cong. (1999). For a discussion of asbestos litigation, see infra text
accompanying notes 90-151. The details of the proposed legislation and the determined
opposition of the leading asbestos lawyers are set forth in an essentially first hand account
246 [Vol.26:243
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in First Amended Complaint, G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd et al., No. 01 Civ. 0216
(RWS), U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y., filed April 30, 2001:
In the wake of Amchem, [see infra note 84] a number of
companies formed the Coalition for Asbestos Resolution (CAR), the
goal of which was to work toward the adoption of legislation
establishing a fair and efficient administrative facility for resolving
asbestos claims. When it was formed, CAR's members included Kaiser
Aluminum Corporation (Kaiser Aluminum), Georgia Pacific
Corporation (Georgia-Pacific), Westinghouse, United States Gypsum
Company (U.S. Gypsum), ABB Combustion Engineering, Turner &
Newell PLC (Turner), Armstrong, and GAF.
[T]he Act was first introduced in October 1998, near the end
of the 105th Congress. With the support of GAF and the CAR, it was
reintroduced at the start of the 106th Congress, in early 1999. The Act
was introduced in both houses of Congress and cosponsored by over
102 senators and congressmen, including nearly the entire Republican
leadership and Democratic Senators Lieberman, Dodd, Toricelli,
Schumer and Moynihan. This legislation was designed to compensate
individuals who are actually sick and to defer resolution of the claims of
"non-sick" individuals until such time as those individuals actually
developed an asbestos-related illness.
[P]ursuant to the Act, an industry-funded national claims
facility was to have been created that would have applied essentially the
same objective medical criteria that were embodied in the Georgine
settlement [that was the subject of Amchem] ....
The Act . . [also] cap[ped] [plaintiffs' attorneys] . . .
contingency fees, which were to be limited to 25% of a claimant's
recovery ....
In February 1999, [one of the leading asbestos lawyers on
behalf of his firm and] . . . other firms working with them, invited the
remaining companies supporting the Act and several other former
asbestos producers to a meeting. The invitation stated that the
plaintiffs' attorneys calling the meeting represented 80 percent of the
pending asbestos plaintiffs' cases, and that they sought a meeting for a
"frank discussion" of the current status of the national asbestos
litigation.
The February 24 meeting was attended, on the asbestos
plaintiffs' side, by [many of the leading asbestos lawyers] . ...
Representatives of GAF, Kaiser Aluminum, W.R. Grace & Co., Owens
Coming, Owens-Illinois, Inc., U.S. Gypsum and others were also
present
Acting as spokesman for the group, [a leading asbestos lawyer]
... stated that efforts to promote or support the Act were viewed by
[plaintiffs' attorneys] ... as starting a "nuclear war." He said that the
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alternative mechanisms to deal with mass tort litigation, courts have
struggled to devise solutions using various forms of aggregative strategies.
Indeed, an additional and critical factor in the increase of mass tort claims
is that the very strategies courts have devised to deal with such claims
facilitate the bringing of more mass tort claims and, in that sense, may be
seen as perverse.' 4 The most prominent and impactuous of these strategies
is the Federal Rule 23 class action, 15 and, in particular, the manner in
which courts have implemented the 1966 amendments to the rule,
changing the procedure from claimants having to affirmatively opt-in to be
a part of a class to allowing lawyers to seek certification of a class of
claimants who are then automatically a part of the litigation unless they
affirmatively choose to opt-out-a change that has yielded profound
consequences, at least in part unintended by the drafters of the amendatory
language.16  Other strategies include: Federal Rule 42 consolidations;
7
[lawyers] . .. were prepared to "fight on whatever level necessary" to
defeat the legislation. He also stated that further support for the Act
would result in "war" that would break out on every front, and that any
company that did not renounce its support for the legislation would be
engulfed in asbestos litigation that "will rage like a fire you will never
control."
[T]wo days after the February 24 meeting, [the leading
asbestos lawyer referred to above] ... and the other asbestos plaintiffs'
attorneys, invited the industry participants to a follow-up meeting to be
held on April 8, 1999 ... At the April 8 meeting, [it is alleged that the
asbestos plaintiffs' attorneys] . . . made it clear that withdrawing
support for the Act was no longer enough and that [they] ... were now
demanding that companies sign letters opposing the Act.. . [Following
these meetings], Georgia-Pacific, ... ABB Combustion Engineering,..
Kaiser Aluminum,. . .Westinghouse, .. .U.S. Gypsum,.. . Turner,..
[and] Armstrong [all] withdrew from CAR ....
Id. 95-128. For an account of these events, see Holman Jenkins, Jr., Now on Video:
America's Scariest Special Interest, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 1999, at A23.
14 See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1825.
15 In order for the litigation to become a class action, it must first be certified under Rule
23(a). See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a). There are four prerequisites for obtaining certification:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members in
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.
Id.
16 For the history of the 1966 amendments and an analysis of the intended effect versus
actual effects of the amendment, see Appendix, included at the end of this article.
17 Subsection (a) of Federal Rule 42 provides specifications for consolidating multiple
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combinations of the class action and consolidation procedures; state court
equivalents; joinder under Federal Rule 20; 18 settlement class actions; 19
use of "bellwether" plaintiffs as a model for disposition of large numbers
of claims; 20 MDL proceedings;21 as well as such other strategies as novel
actions. The Rule states that:
When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the
matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated;
and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may
tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
Therefore, under Rule 42(a), a court may, for reasons of cost efficiency or to
avoid delay, merge all of the actions before it that share similar foundations in law or fact.
See Rose v. Medtronics, Inc., 107 Cal. App. 3d 150, 155 (1980) (citing a list of federal
court cases declining to certify mass tort class actions and stating that "consolidation of
actions is the preferred procedure"); see also Ripa v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp.,
660 A.2d 521, 533 (N.J. Super. 1995) (observing that "tens of thousands of asbestos
claims are proceeding in the federal courts on a consolidated basis"); infra note 46.
18 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow large number of plaintiffs to join a single
action when claims arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions
or occurrences. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (governing compulsory joinder of parties); FED.
R. CIrV. P. 20 (governing permissive joinder of parties); see also Federal Interpleader Act,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (1994) (governing statutory interpleader); FED. R. Civ. P.
14 (governing impleader); FED. R. Civ. P. 22 (governing rule interpleader); FED. R. CIV.
P. 24 (governing intervention); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 378-79 (West 1973); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 1002 (McKinney 1976).
19 See infra notes 83-87.
20 The use of "bellwether" or test plaintiffs has developed as an alternative to the use of
class actions. See Richard Faulk et al., Building a Better Mousetrap? A New Approach
to Trying Mass Tort Cases, 29 TEX. TECH L. REv. 779, 791-92 (1998); see also R.
Joseph Barton, Note, Utilizing Statistics and Bellwether Trials in Mass Torts: What Do
the Constitution and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Permit?, 8 WM. & MARY BILL OF
RIGHTS J. 199 (1999). "The term bellwether is derived from the ancient practice of belling
a wether (a male sheep) selected to lead his flock." In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d
1016, 1019 (5th Cir. 1997). The ultimate purpose was to determine the confidence of the
flock "that the wether would not lead them astray." Id.
A similar analogy applies to the use of test plaintiffs in mass torts. The
bellwether approach focuses on the trial of a small number of plaintiffs (sometimes
referred to as "mini-trials"), usually with the claims of the other plaintiffs stayed pending
resolution of the test cases. See Shawn Copeland et al., Toxic Tort and Environmental
Matters: Civil Litigation 64 ALI-ABA 33 (Jan. 22, 1998). For a controversial example
of the structuring of mini-trials to the great disadvantage of defendants and the
extrapolation to non-bellwether plaintiffs, see Cimino v. Raymark Indus., 751 F. Supp.
649, 663-64 (E.D. Tex 1990) (using statistically significant plaintiffs to determine
average value), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998); see also
In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d at 1022 (granting mandamus relief to defendants
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because, "[c]onducting an imperfect bellwether trial in this case threatens . . to force
defendants to settle even when they might have meritorious defenses.") (Jones, J.,
concurring); In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613 (3d Cir. 1999) (reversing the extension of
summary judgement to non-trial plaintiffs for failure to present sufficient evidence of
exposure); Deluca v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941, 952 (3d Cir. 1990)
(explaining that collateral estoppel principles did not permit the extension of the findings
of a multi-district litigation, consolidated common issues trial to plaintiffs not parties to
that trial).
21 MDL or "multi-district litigation" is a form of aggregating cases where several similar
actions have been filed nationwide and federal court judges ask the Judicial Panel on
Multi-district Litigation to consolidate the actions before one judge for pretrial purposes.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994). Multi-district procedure provides that upon the motion of
any party or upon the court's own motion, the nine-member Judicial Panel on Multi-
district Litigation will order transfer if the following prerequisites are met: (1) the actions
to be coordinated or consolidated involve one or more common questions of fact; (2)
transfer will promote the convenience of the parties and witnesses; and (3) transfer must
result in the just and efficient conduct of the actions transferred. See id. For example, the
Judicial Panel on Multi-district Litigation consolidated a number of asbestos cases before
Judge Jack Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York. See In re Asbestos Prod.
Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991); see also JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION 24 (Northwestem Univ. Press 1995). Although the
MDL procedures contemplate that actions are transferred for the purposes of pretrial
proceedings and are to be remanded for trial to the district from which the action was
transferred, in practice only a small percentage of actions are remanded. See Copeland et
al., supra note 20, at 40. Most actions are either settled in the transferee court or tried in
the transferee court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), change of venue, or parties' consent.
See id; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994) (allowing transfer "[flor the convenience of
parties . . . in the interest of justice"). Under any of the consolidation mechanisms, the
primary prerequisite is that the actions involve a common question of law or fact, and that
the common issue be central to the actions to be consolidated. See, e.g., Molever v.
Levenson, 539 F.2d 996, 1003 (4th Cir. 1976) (demonstrating the harmful effects of
erroneous consolidation when there is not a "common question of law or fact").
Although the consolidation improves the efficiency of the pre-trial process,
courts still face the daunting possibility of adjudicating numerous similar claims. See
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) 323 (1995) ("[I]n appropriate circumstances,
a joint trial for common issues may be feasible, followed by separate trials of remaining
issues."). Unlike a class action, consolidation of separate actions "does not merge the
suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties
in one suit parties in another." In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d at 724 (quoting Johnson v.
Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 497 (1933)); Advery v. Celotex, 962 F.2d 1177, 1180
(6th Cir. 1992) (explaining that consolidation "does not merge the independent actions
into a single cause"); see also Charles SilVer, Comparing Class Actions and
Consolidations, 10 REV. LITIG. 495, 497 (1991) ("[A] class action is a single lawsuit that
binds a large number of people, while a consolidation is a set of independent lawsuits that
are processed in a coordinated and relatively efficient way."). Accordingly, consolidated
actions do not permit a claimant the right to "opt-out" as does a class action certified
under Rule 23(b)(3). See WEINSTEIN, supra at 139.
2 LAWYERS' ETHICS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
procedural approaches; 22 successor liability rulings; revised evidentiary
standards; 23  loosened standards for proving causation; and the
interpretation of insurance contracts to maximize the availability of assets
to meet claimants' demands.24 In addition to these judicially crafted
solutions, lawyers have also devised informal aggregative strategies that
confer on them the same coercive powers as judicially crafted strategies. 25
These judicially crafted solutions have generated a cornucopia of
scholarly writings addressing the mass tort and class action phenomena.26
Comparatively little, however, has been written about the perverse effect
of these strategies on the generation of claims, including the creation of
22 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 n.8 (5th Cir. 1986)
(providing for the calculation of damages prior to a determination of liability-called a
reverse bifurcation, in order to find the approximate tort value of a claim and thereby
promote settlement); Flatt v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 488 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Tex.
1980) (use of non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel to avoid duplicative litigation of
such issues as the harmful effects of asbestos exposure).
23 See, e.g., Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co., 949 F.2d 167, 172-73 (5th Cir. 1991);
Whatley v. Armstrong World Indus., 861 F.2d 837, 840 (5th Cir. 1989) (allowing the
liberal use of circumstantial evidence to overcome plaintiff's inability otherwise to
establish proximate cause in cases where proving exposure to particular products was not
realistically possible); see also infra note 142.
24 For an analysis of how these other strategies have come to play a key role in asbestos
litigation, see Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1832 n.51, 1840-52, 1873-
84. Litigation brought by governmental entities against tobacco or gun manufacturers,
even though not aggregative in form, may be seen, nonetheless, as functionally
aggregative in nature because the amounts of damages sought can have the same coercive
effects as described in Part L.A of this Article.
25 Claims can also be aggregated by lawyers coordinating their activities to such an extent
that even though the claims they bring are independent and proceed as separate lawsuits,
the "litigation" is effectively "a single integrated whole." See Howard M. Erichson,
Informal Aggregation: Procedural and Ethical Implications of Coordination Among
Counsel in Related Lawsuits, 50 DUKE L.J. 381, 383-84 (2000).
26 See, e.g., Symposium, Complex Litigation at the Millennium, 64 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (2001); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Futures Problem, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1901
(2000); Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State
Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 1867 (2000); David Rosenberg, Mass
Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don't, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
393 (2000); Alan N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-
Threatening Mass Tort Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 2045 (2000); Mark C. Weber, Mass
Jury Trials in Mass Tort Cases: Some Preliminary Issues, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 463
(1998); Symposium on Mass Tort, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 353 (1998); Richard A.
Nagareda, The Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action, 85 GEO. L.J. 295 (1996);
Richard L. Marcus, They Can't Do That, Can They? Tort Reform Via Rule 23, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 858 (1995).
2001]
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substantial financial incentives for lawyers to recruit new claimants to
supplement or replace those whose claims have been resolyed.27 This
cycle maintains pressure on courts to devise new solutions in a continuing
and ultimately unsuccessful effort to clear their dockets.28  These
recruitment efforts are one of several systemic strategies that may be seen
to be abusive as they advance lawyers' interests but arguably do not
increase social welfare.
A. Systemic Issues Raised by Mass Tort Litigation
1. The Coercive Effect of Aggregation
In response to burgeoning mass tort litigation, the tort system has
struggled to get its arms around this relatively recent phenomenon of
thousands of claimants alleging similar injuries that run the gamut from
the severe to the minor to the nonexistent, asserting claims against one or a
handful of corporate actors, posing problems of equity amongst the
claimants and problems of fairness for the defendants. The fairness issue
arises mainly because the aggregation of claims often pressures a
defendant or defendants to settle claims irrespective of their merits. 29 Even
if a defendant perceives that it has a substantial likelihood of prevailing, if
the number of claims is high enough to constitute a threat to the economic
viability of the company, a corporate decision maker, motivated by the
short-term consideration of fear of losing the company on his or her watch,
will often agree to settle the claims even if the long-term interests of the
corporation are to litigate the claims fully. This is so because the
aggregated claims, which invariably include a demand for punitive
27 For one such analysis, see Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, A Letter to the Nation's
Trial Judges: How the Focus on Efficiency is Hurting You and Innocent Victims in
Asbestos Liability Cases, 24 AM J. TRIAL ADVOC. 247, 248-51 (2000). For an account of
how a massive consolidation generated dramatic increases in claim filings, see Brickman,
Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1873 n.23 1.
28 "Judges who move large numbers of highly elastic mass torts through their litigation
process at low transaction costs create the opportunity for new filings. They increase the
demand for new cases by their high resolution rates and low transaction costs. If you
build a superhighway, there will be a traffic jam." Francis E. McGovern, The Defensive
Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 595, 606 (1997).
29 Aggregation "enables some plaintiffs' lawyers to bring weak if not false claims in
sufficient quantity as to require defendants to choose between settlement and
bankruptcy." Judith Resnick et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships,
Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 306 n.31 (1996).
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damages,30 potentially exceed the combined assets of the corporations and
any available insurance. This presents a "bet-the-company" scenario
especially since, if the claims are tried to verdict and yield a huge
judgment, they become, in reality, essentially unappealable because of the
typical requirement that a cash bond be posted of at least the amount of the
verdict in order to stay execution of the judgment during appeal. 31 Thus,
the incentive for plaintiff lawyers is to generate a sufficient number of
claims in order to achieve a threat level that will compel settlement. "The
more the merrier" approach induces lawyers to include as many persons as
possible in aggregated claims irrespective of whether those included have
suffered injury.
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.32 presents the most cogent
discussion in the judicial literature of the effects of the bet-the-company
scenario that are created when a court grants certification of a class in a
class action. In that case, a group of hemophiliacs infected with HIV
brought a nationwide class action against drug companies that
manufactured blood solids infected with the virus. The district court
certified one of the 300 cases that had been brought as a class action. 33 On
appeal, Judge Richard Posner ordered that the class be decertified, adding
that it was important that the Circuit Court do this at an early stage of the
proceedings, rather than wait to decide the certification issue after a final
30 The threat of punitive damages exerts substantial pressures on defendants to settle mass
tort cases. See Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements,
1998 Wisc. L. REv. 169, 208 (1998). Even when the plaintiff has very little chance of
prevailing, inflates the settlement amount. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The
Predictability of Punitive Damages, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 625 (1997).
31 It may be thought that Fortune 500 companies, with their extensive lines of credit,
could readily pass a bond of at least several billion dollars. No doubt several of the
largest corporations with considerable liquid assets could do so, but most could not. If a
multi-billion dollar judgment were assessed that threatened the economic viability of the
corporation, banks would likely cancel lines of credit on the grounds of insolvency,
leading to an eminent bankruptcy filing. It is precisely such a scenario that the general
counsel of a Fortune 500 company would present to the CEO in assessing whether to
settle an aggregated set of claims or litigate them. While CEOs have both short-term and
long-term objectives in managing the corporation, the prospect, even though remote, of a
judgment forcing a bankruptcy filing, the virtual equivalent of capital punishment for that
set of managers, usually elevates short-term considerations ("not on my watch") over a
corporation's longer term interests which may include stoutly resisting extortive litigation.
32 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995). For a discussion of the implications of Rhone-Poulenc,
see Research Memorandum No. 10 by Lester Brickman, Class Action Reform: Beyond
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, to the Manhattan Institute (Oct. 1995).
33See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296.
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judgment was brought up on appeal, because the defendants would then be
exposed to a great risk, which would likely lead to a settlement and thus
foreclose the possibility of appeal.34  It was therefore necessary to
determine whether the level of risk necessarily created by certification was
outweighed by the benefits that would accrue to the class.3 ' Here that
balancing test weighed heavily in favor of the defendant. First, this was
not a case where the individual claims were small as compared to the cost
of litigation and thus not otherwise litigable. In addition, the merits of the
claim were doubtful.36 It would therefore be unfair to the drug
manufacturers to have to decide whether to put the company at grave risk
by going forward with their defense against possibly meritless claims or to
succumb to the financial pressures created by certification and settle early
in the proceeding. Accordingly, the court reversed the class certification
granted by the district court.
The cogency of Judge Posner's argument has had an ameliorating
effect on the propensity of federal judges to certify class actions; 37 it may
34 Whereas without certification, individual plaintiffs could maintain separate actions
against the drug manufacturers, who would then only be required to pay damages in
successful cases, if the class certification remained, the drug manufacturers would have to
defend against thousands of plaintiffs. Litigating against so many plaintiffs would expose
the company to enormous risk, thus subjecting it to "intense pressure to settle." See id. at
1297-98. ("They might, therefore, easily be facing $25 billion in potential liability
(conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy.").
35Id. at 1299. The court discussed the types of factors that should be considered:
The first concern with forcing these defendants to stake their companies
on the outcome of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of
bankruptcy to settle even if they have no legal liability, when it is
entirely feasible to allow a final, authoritative determination of their
liability for the colossal misfortune that has befallen the hemophiliac
population to emerge from a decentralized process of multiple trials,
involving different juries, and different standards of liability, in
different jurisdictions; and when, in addition, the preliminary
indications are that the defendants are not liable for the grievous harm
that has befallen the members of the class. These qualifications are
important.
Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
36 To that point, thirteen cases had previously been litigated and defendants had prevailed
in twelve of these. See Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1296, 1299.
37 See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). "[C]lass
certification magnifies and strengthens the number of unmeritorious claims . . . [and]
creates insurmountable pressure on defendants to settle, whereas individual trials would
not." Id. at 746. The court noted that this phenomenon has been referred to as "judicial
blackmail." Id.; see also In re Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 109 F.3d 1016, 1022 (5th Cir. 1997)
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also have contributed to a sea change in some state courts' propensities for
certifying class actions, as well.38
(granting mandamus relief to defendants because "[c]onducting an imperfect bellwether
trial in this case threatens a similar effect... [to the effects that certification would have
had in Rhone-Poulenc and Castano due to] its tendency to force defendants to settle even
when they might have meritorious defenses"); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069,
1085 (6th Cir. 1996) (granting petitioners mandamus relief based on the abuse of
discretion exercised by the district court judge in certifying the class despite the fact that
"the economies of scale achieved by class treatment are more than offset by the
individualization of numerous issues relevant only to a particular plaintiff," along with
many other misjudgments made by the lower court); Andrews v. Am. Tel. & Telegraph
Co., 95 F.3d 1014, 1023 (11 th Cir. 1996) (reversing the class certification order largely
due to appellants' assertion that "insurmountable difficulties in managing these actions
make class action inferior to other available methods, specifically case-by-case litigation
of individual claims"); In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Prod. Liab. Litig, 177 F.R.D. 360,
375 (E.D. La. 1997) (refusing to grant class certification because certification may create
undue pressure on defendants to settle). See generally Mullinex, infra note 50, at 1709
(stating [F]ederal courts have articulated an increasingly conservative class action
jurisprudence that has directed federal courts to stringently scrutinize proposed litigation
and settlement classes. Consequently, it has become increasingly difficult for plaintiffs to
pursue certain types of class actions in the federal arena"). See Glenn A. Danas, The
Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Another Congressional Attempt to
Federalize State Law, 49 EMORY L.J. 1305, 1306 (2000) ("[B]y the mid-1990's, federal
courts became increasingly hostile towards damages class certification.").
38 See Linda Mullenix, Remarks at the New York ABA National Institute on Class
Actions Meeting (Oct. 13, 2000), quoted in Gary Weinstein, Class Actions: A Look at
the Future, and Some Controversies in Class Action Law, 8 METRO. CORP. COUNS. n. 12,
Dec. 2000, available at WL 12/00 METCC 40 (col.1):
An example of a quick change in class certification
jurisprudence was cited by Professor Linda S. Mullenix, who reviewed
state court rulings. This year in Texas, Mullenix noted, three decisions
by the Texas Supreme Court resulted in significant restrictions on class
certifications: Southwestern Refining Co. v. Bernal (960 S.W.2d 293, 1
CLASS 82, 5/26/00), Ford Motor Co. v. Sheldon (965 S.W.2d 65, 1
CLASS 85, 5/26/00), and Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson (22 S.W.3d 398,
1 CLASS 119, 6/9/00).
In Bernal, the Texas Supreme Court overturned certification of
a class of 904 plaintiffs allegedly harmed by a refinery explosion. The
court said the plaintiffs failed to show a predominance of common
issues of law and fact. The Sheldon court decertified a class of motor
vehicle owners who alleged their cars were damaged by Ford Motor
Co.'s paint process, holding that individual class members could not be
easily identified. The Texas court in Beeson ruled that the parameters
of a plaintiff class cannot be defined by a de facto determination of the
merits of the class claims.
These cases, Ms. Mullenix said, establish strict new standards
on class definitions in Texas and make it "much more difficult for
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The Seventh Circuit has again focused on the coercive effect of
class certification in Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc.3 9 In Szabo, the
District Court had certified a nationwide class of all persons who
purchased a certain computerized machine after January 1996 and claimed
breach of warranty, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. 40 In response
to the parties' factual dispute, the District Court held that is was obliged to
accept the substantive allegations of the complaint as true and rejected
Bridgeport's arguments as an inappropriate attempt to litigate the merits of
the claims.4' Judge Frank Easterbrook, joined by Judges Richard Posner
and Ann Williams, granted Bridgeport's request for discretionary appellate
review under new Federal Rule 23(0,42 and vacated the district court's
certification of the class, stating that the class certification:
turns a $200,000 dispute ... into a $200 million dispute.
Such a claim puts a bet-your-company decision to
Bridgeport's managers and may induce a substantial
settlement even if the customers' position is weak. This is
a prime occasion for the use of Rule 23(f), not only because
of the pressure that class certification places on the
defendant but also because the ensuing settlement prevents
resolution of the underlying issues.43
The Szabo case thus instructs the trial court not to simply defer to a
plaintiffs to obtain class certification."
The impact of the Texas rulings, which have come to be
known as the "Texas trilogy," is profound and immediate. The rulings
may be followed by federal district courts, she said. And in Texas,
there have been four class certifications that were withdrawn,
remanded, or reversed, based on the trilogy.
Id.
39 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001).
40 Szabo v. Bridgeport Mach., Inc., 199 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Ind. 2001).
41 Id. at 284, 286, 293-94.
42 Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f), added in 1998, provides that "[a] court of appeals may in its
discretion permit an appeal from an order of a district court granting or denying class
action certification." FED. R. CIv. P. 23(f). Judge Easterbrook contended with the
absence of guidelines for the exercise of discretion in Rule 23(f) appeals in Blair v.
Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834-35 (7th Cir. 1999), stating that "[d]isputes
about class certification cannot be divorced from the merits-indeed, one of the
fundamental unanswered questions is whether judges should be influenced by their
tentative view of the merits when deciding whether to certify a class." Id. at 835.
43Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675.
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plaintiffs allegations either as to the facts or as to the appropriate
composition of the class and to instead at least preliminarily inquire into
the merits of the claims because the coercive effect that certification and
over-broad class periods or over-inclusive classes have on defendants
deprives them of any realistic opportunity to later contest these issues."
A "kissing cousin" of the extortive power granted to attorneys by
Federal Rule 23 and state court equivalents is the use of Federal Rule 42
consolidations45 and state court equivalents. By bringing hundreds and
even thousands of individual lawsuits alleging substantially identical
claims against a single or small group of defendants, lawyers are able to
exert great pressures on judges to consolidate the cases for trial. The more
cases filed, the greater the pressure on judges to consolidate them and
resort to various short cuts such as "mini-trials" that invariably work to the
disadvantage of defendants.46
44 The Seventh Circuit thus adopted an argument that Professor George Priest had
previously urged in commenting on Rhone-Poulenc:
I think given the great hydraulic pressure that is created by the
aggregation of cases, that it's necessary to evaluate the ultimate merits
of the case as best as possible at the point of certification. If the
economic power of the certification of the class is such that, if certified,
the defendant will settle on some terms, then it seems to me that it's
necessary in order to achieve the goals of justice in our society, to
evaluate the merits of the claims as to whether the claims have
sufficient merit on their face without a lot of discovery and to examine
whether the claims have sufficient potential merit to justify the creation
of great economic power through class certification."
George Priest, Economics of Class Actions, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 481, 483 (2000).
The implications of Szabo for Rule I Ob-5 litigation is explored in Sarah S. Gold & Leon
P. Gold, No Deference Given to Plaintiff Allegations in Class Certification, N.Y.L.J.,
July 11, 2001, at 3.
See FED R. Civ. P. 42(a).
46 Consolidations typically enable plaintiff lawyers to literally overwhelm juries'
capacities to distinguish between claims of those actually injured and claims on behalf of
unimpaired persons. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1873-81. It is
not a matter of venal or incompetent judges but rather the ineluctable pressures generated
by burdens on dockets. As noted by Conrad L. Mallett, Jr., former Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Michigan:
Think about a country trial circuit judge who has dropped on her 5,000
asbestos cases all at the same time . . . [I]f she scheduled all 5,000
cases for one week trials, she would not complete her task until the year
2095. The judge's first thought then is, "How do I handle these cases
quickly and efficiently?" The judge does not purposely ignore, fairness
and truth, but the demands of the system require [that certain values be
sacrificed].
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Indeed, once consolidated, the pressure is then on defendants to
settle the cases because the aggregative strategy creates economic threats
similar to those created by the certification of a class in a class action.
Lawyers therefore have a strong incentive to bring claims not only on
behalf of seriously injured claimants but also on behalf of claimants
without any injury.47 By including these latter claims in the consolidation,
lawyers are able to gain settlements for unimpaired persons.
2. Other Systemic Abuses of Mass Tort Litigation
While forum shopping has always been an occasional form of
litigation abuse, with the increased frequency of mass tort litigation, forum
shopping abuse has become both more prevalent and has taken on new
importance. Filing a case before a judge known or believed to be likely to
act favorably toward plaintiffs' counsel or likely to be predisposed to
finding in favor of the cause of action and where juries have a high
propensity for favoring claimants over "big business" defendants is often a
critical factor in coercing defendants to settle the claims.48 Indeed, even
as many jurists have come to realize the perverse nature of aggregating
litigation as a "solution" for the mass tort phenomenon, a mere handful of
state and federal judges, carefully and meticulously selected by lawyers
exercising a choice of whether to file claims virtually anywhere in the
country in state or federal courts, have nonetheless continued to approve
aggregative strategies and thereby coerced defendants into paying billions
of dollars to settle aggregated claims. For this reason, forum shopping has
become a prominent factor in accounting for increased class action filings,
particularly in state courts. 4 9 The "Gulf States" (Mississippi, Florida,
The Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1283 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 155 (1999) (statement of the Hon. Conrad
L. Mallet, Jr.).
47Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 27, at 252-56.
48 As stated by Professor Wolfram:
[T]he most critical element of luck is having the case end up before the
right judge. Successful class-action fee awards require either a judge
who is decidedly pro-plaintiff or one who is emphatically pro-
settlement. Either will do and a combination of the two is optimal. The
chances for judge-shopping are significant (although hardly infinite),
particularly when dealing with a class with membership in many states.
Wolfram, supra note 9, at 1232; see also Gregory C. Read, Stand Up and Be Counted, 67
DEF. CouNs. J. 423, 424 (2000).
49 These lawyers manipulate the legal system by filing massive class actions in
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Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas), along with other rural areas, are
particularly notorious venues for such forum shopping.
50
"hometown state courts." See Eddie Curran, Legal Growth Industry Has Made Plaintiffs
of All of Us, MOBILE REGIS., Dec. 26, 1999 available at http://www.al.com/news/mobile/
Dec 1999/5pt-1 .html (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Curran, Legal Growth]. In
these smaller, rural forums they will often find "supportive judges, plaintiff-friendly rules,
and generous juries." Id.; see generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Class Actions in the Gulf
States: Empirical Analysis of a Cultural Stereotype, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1681 (2000).
50 See Miller, supra note 49, at 1681 (stating that "These states are paradise for plaintiffs'
attorneys and purgatory for the defense"); Linda S. Mullenix, Abandoning the Federal
Class Action Ship: Is There Smoother Sailing For Class Actions in Gulf Waters?, 74 TUL.
L. REv. 1709 (2000) (stating that "[m]any class counsel have abandoned the federal
courts in favor of what are perceived to be more receptive state court forums. Against
this backdrop, the Gulf States have earned the reputation as 'magnet forums' for class
action litigation"). Other jurisdictions that have become favorite venues for lawyers
bringing class actions are: Madison County, Illinois, where 70 class actions were filed
between January 1, 1998 and March 7, 2001; Jefferson County, Texas, where 41 class
actions were filed between January 1, 1998 and January 31, 2001; and Palm Beach
County, Florida, where 91 class actions were filed in the 1998-2000 period. See John H.
Beisner & Jessica D. Miller, They're Making a Federal Case Out OfIt... In State Court,
Manhattan Inst., Sept. 2001, at 12, 19, 23.
These states are chosen for a multitude of reasons. Some believe that class
counsel selects these fora because they are so remote, thereby making the entire procedure
more difficult for defendants. See Glenn A. Danas, The Interstate Class Action
Jurisdiction Act of 1999: Another Congressional Attempt to Federalize State Law, 49
EMORY L.J. 1305, 1322 (2000) (quoting Susan Koniak about an approved settlement in
Union County, Tennessee: "no one could get there, you couldn't fly to object. And that's
common. Often these state courts are picked, and they are in the middle of nowhere. You
can't have access to the documents.").
Others propose that these states' popularity with plaintiffs' lawyers may be due
to their bias against out-of-state businesses and corporations, and their propensity not to
be as rigorous as federal courts in applying the certification standards for a class action.
See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens & Leah Lorber, Federal Courts Should Decide
Interstate Class Actions: A Call For Federal Class Action Diversity Jurisdiction Reform,
37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 483, 484 (2000). "Unlike the scrupulous practice of federal judges,
some state judges have taken laissez-faire attitudes toward class certification. As a result,
entrepreneurial contingency fee attorneys can bypass the rigorous review given by the
federal judges and obtain certification of questionable claims and approval or outrageous
settlement agreements." Id. at 499; see also Eddie Curran, Plaintiffs-Friendly County,
MOBILE REGIS., Dec. 26, 1999, available at http://www.al.com/news/mobile/D
ec 1999/5pt- I -5.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) (discussing why plaintiffs' lawyers flock
to Greene County, Alabama, which has a strong reputation for being pro-plaintiff).
Another theory advanced is that these rural state courts are more receptive to
plaintiffs because state court judges are more likely to fraternize with local attorneys who
initiate these lawsuits. See, e.g., Eddie Curran, Should Judges, Lawyers Travel
Together?, MOBILE REGIS., Dec. 27, 1999, available at http://www.al.com/new
s/mobile/Dec1999/5pt-2-2.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2001) (citing many instances of such
Am
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One abuse that has become prevalent in this region is the use of ex
parte or conditional certifications. 51  Also known as "drive-by
certifications," these class certifications are provisionally granted by the
court after a request by plaintiffs' lawyer before the defendant has been
served with a complaint, thereby denying defendants' right to contest the
certification.
52
Up until 1997, when the Alabama Supreme Court, following a
change in its elected membership, started to reverse lower courts' class
certifications, 53 Alabama was the forum where "drive-by" certifications
activity, such as state judges accompanying local firms to the Super Bowl, flying in their
private planes, and in some cases joining those local firms after they retire from their
judgeships. Federal judges, by comparison, are less likely to socialize with lawyers who
regularly appear before them.). Aggregative strategies have been widely used in
asbestos litigation and have contributed significantly to the enormous expansion of that
litigation over the past decade. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at
1868. In addition to the use of aggregations, another major factor in that enormous
expansion has been the use of forum shopping. As set forth in infra text accompanying
notes 89-151, a defining characteristic of asbestos litigation is the mass production of
claims on behalf of unimpaired persons. The geographical distribution of these claims
varies on the basis of the propensity for success in that jurisdiction.
In jurisdictions known to be favorable toward asbestos plaintiffs, the
ratio of unimpaired, non-malignant claims to malignant claims is
dramatically higher than in other jurisdictions, with no rational
explanation attributable to medical or biological factors. A recent
actuarial study graphically shows this wide variability among states
which is not driven by disease but rather by the ability of plaintiffs'
lawyers to bring unimpaired claims in pro-plaintiffjurisdictions ....
Babcock & Wilcox's Report to the Court Regarding Asbestos Developments Generally
and the Proofs of Claims Filed Here at 13, In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., Civ. No. 00-
0558, Bankr. Case No. 00-10992 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2001). Particularly pro-plaintiff
courts for the bringing of unimpaired asbestos claims are located in certain counties in
Texas and Mississippi. Id. at 16 (citation omitted). In Mississippi, the ratio of
unimpaired non-malignant claims to malignant claims has been 47:1 since 1998 whereas
in California, the ratio has been 2.8:1. Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
51 See Read, supra note 48, at 424.
52 See Max Boot, In the Land of Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1996, at A22. (reporting
that "the first the companies heard about [the class certification] was when they received
notice in the mail that a class action had already been certified. .. ").
53 See, e.g., Ex parte Government Employees Ins. Co., 729 So. 2d 299 (Ala. 1999); Ex
parte Water Works and Sewer Board of City of Birmingham., 738 So. 2d 783 (Ala.
1998); Ex parte AmSouth Bancorporation, 717 So. 2d 357 (Ala. 1998); Ex parte Citicorp
Acceptance Co., 715 So. 2d 199 (Ala. 1997); Ex parte First Nat'l Bank of Jasper, 717 So.
2d 342 (Ala. 1997).
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flourished most, and where a hand-full of judges readily certified all class
action filings almost without exception.
54
Forum shopping abuse also occurs when plaintiff lawyers are
denied class certification in a federal court and thereafter seek nationwide
class action certification in a state court." The propensity of certain state
courts to grant certification under these circumstances has diminished in
recent years as some state courts have begun to apply similar standards of
certification as those set by the federal courts.56 Still, in other state courts,
forum shopping abuses continue unchecked.
57
54 Certain rural counties in Alabama have been favorite havens for the filing of class
actions because of the unusual propensity for certain state court judges in that county to
certify class actions. See generally Curran, Legal Growth, supra note 49 (discussing the
general history of class actions with special focus on the controversial role played by
some Alabama attorneys and judges).
Although Alabama trial courts use a "blind lottery" for assigning new cases to
judges, out of the seven judges in the Mobile court system, two law firms that specialize
in class action suits were frequently able to get their cases assigned to two plaintiff-
friendly judges, Judges Braxton Kittrell and Robert Kendall. In fact, in one two year
period from 1996 to 1997, eleven consecutive class action suits filed by one of these firms
were assigned to one of these two judges, whereas no other class actions filed by that firm
were assigned to any of the other five Mobile circuit judges. Suspicions raised by this
supposedly random "blind lottery" were magnified when following Judge Kittrell's
retirement, he was hired as a partner by one of these firms that often sought him out for
class certification. See id.
55As stated by Professor Mullenix:
Perhaps the most notorious example of [this] . . . occurred in the
General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Products Liability
Litigation, a consumer class action rejected by both the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and (subsequently) the Texas
Supreme Court. Notwithstanding these well-reasoned and articulated
decisions, the plaintiffs' attorneys simply regrouped and pursued
separate statewide settlement classes in Louisiana and Georgia.
Mullenix, supra note 50, at 1716.
56 See id. at 1753-80 (stating that since 1997, the Louisiana Supreme Court and appellate
courts have overturned at least five class certifications based on the Supreme Court
decision of Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1998). As noted, the
Alabama Supreme Court has begun to follow many of these same federal standards set
primarily by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit, and the Texas Supreme Court has, since
Spring of 2000, reversed class certification on three separate claims); see also Mullenix,
supra note 38 (labeling these three Texas rulings as the "Texas trilogy," and further
hypothesizing that these cases make it, "much more difficult for plaintiffs to obtain class
certification").
This is especially the case in Mississippi, where, since 1995, juries have returned at
least nineteen verdicts of nine million dollars or more in litigation involving the
manufacturers of prescription drugs, cigarettes, lead paint, and asbestos products,
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Forum shopping abuses in federal court also occur, though to a
much lesser extent and involve the use of strategies designed to select a
particular federal judge known or believed to be favorable to the interests
of the plaintiffs' lawyers to hear a matter. An example of one such
strategy is filing a claim in a federal district in which there is a sole
judge.58
including five verdicts that were over one hundred million dollars each:
[T]he Circuit Court in Jefferson County in rural southwest
Mississippi-one of the poorest counties in one of the nation's poorest
states-has indisputably become a popular destination for lawyers suing
makers of prescription drugs, cigarettes, lead paint and asbestos
products . . . [The] president of the Mississippi Trial Lawyers
Association, which represents plaintiffs' lawyers, said: "The general
public may say, 'Who cares state court, federal court, what difference
does it make?' In our state, it's the difference between winning and
losing. I've gotten many multimillion-dollar judgments in state court
over my 17-year career, but I've never won a judgment of any
significant size for plaintiffs in federal court."
Robert Pear, Mississippi Gaining As Lawsuit Mecca: High Jury Awards Raise Stakes in
Patients' Right Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at Al. It is notable that in Jefferson
County with only 9,740 occupants, more than 21,000 people were plaintiffs in the period
1995 to 2000. Id.; see also Mullenix, supra note 50, at 1778-80 (reinforcing that this
trend of a more stringent standard is still tentative, and that it does not even hold true for
all of the "Gulf States." "These federal decisions have had relatively no impact on
Mississippi; Florida also remains a popular venue for forum shopping .... ").
58 This was the method used in Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., 14 F. Supp. 2d 956 (E.D. Tex.
1997) where plaintiffs' lawyers ("private counsel"), hired on a contingency fee basis by
Texas Attorney General Dan Morales, filed an action against the tobacco manufacturers
in federal district court in the Eastern District of Texas, Texarkana, Division, where U.S.
District Court Judge David Folsom solely presided. Of the approximately forty cases
filed by the states against tobacco manufacturers, this was the only one filed in federal
court. See generally Complaint, Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 5:96-CV-91 (E.D. Tex.
1996). While Judge Folson did dismiss several of the State's claims, he did sustain the
critical parts of the suit, and approved the State's proposed proof of damages by use of a
statistical model, the details of which were not available to him when he made his
decision. See Patterson & Philpott, supra note 7, at 563-64, 574-75. Most importantly,
however, Judge Folsom fully merited the unusual efforts of private counsel to select him
to preside over Texas' action against the tobacco companies by consistently ruling in
favor of the financial interests of private counsel.
In January 1998, several Texas legislators filed a mandamus action in Texas
state court challenging the authority of Attorney General Morales to bind the state to a
contingency fee agreement. Private counsel removed that action to the federal court. In
re Senator Troy Fraser, No. 5:98-CV-45 (E.D. Tex. 1998). Later, for procedural reasons
stemming from an arbitration panel's award of 3.3 billion dollars in fees over a 25-year
period, the challenge to Morales' action was found mooted. Fraser v. Real Parties, Nos.
00-40024, 00-40036, 00-40038 (5th Cir. 2000). The effect of this maneuvering was to
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Another method is to invoke the policy of assigning cases to a
specific judge if the claim is "related" to an existing case that the judge is
hearing or has heard. 59 Because of his propensity for using tort litigation as
deny to Texas state courts any role in determining the reasonableness of the fees awarded
private counsel under the disciplinary standards adopted by the Texas Supreme Court.
Effectively then, Texas courts, and ultimately the Texas Supreme Court, were precluded
from applying the Texas Rules of Professional Discipline to determine whether the fees in
the tobacco litigation violated the ethical standards adopted by the Texas Supreme Court.
While these and other related proceedings were wending their way through the
courts, the Texas press reported that noted Texas attorney, Joe Jamail, had been invited
by Morales to be one of the private counsel but, as a condition of selection, would have to
pay Morales one million dollars. Jamail stated that he refused the demand and was not
one of those selected. See Deborah Tedford, Jury Eyes Tobacco Legal Fees, HOUS.
CHRON., Nov. 30, 2000, at 37.
Attorney General Morales did not run for re-election, and in April 2000, a new
Texas Attorney General, John Comyn, filed an action in state court seeking to depose
private counsel "to investigate potential claims it [the State of Texas] believes it may
possess for conversion and breach of fiduciary duty." State of Texas v. Walter Umphrey
et al., No. 00-40999, (5th Cir. 2001). Among the information the State was seeking was
to discover whether they should have known that the fee agreement was unenforceable,
whether they improperly sought to benefit themselves at the State's expense, and whether
tobacco litigation documents were withheld from the state. Id. at note 6. Private counsel
removed this action to federal court and Judge Folsom denied the State's motion to
remand, invoking the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C § 1651 (1994), to protect the federal
court's judgment. This had the effect of quashing Attorney General Cornyn's
investigation. The Fifth Circuit reversed, stating that the federal courts "cannot preclude
the State of Texas from investigating potential claims in the milieu of the Texas courts
pursuant to Texas law-unless and until such investigation poses an actual threat to the
settlement agreement." Id.; see also Mark Ballard, Biggest Little Court in Texas:
Plaintiffs Flock to Texarkana, with Billion-Dollar Suits, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 30, 1999, at
Al. (The author was retained by the Counsel to the Governor of Texas who was seeking
to intervene in the tobacco litigation fee-setting process, to provide an affidavit with
regard to: (1) fiduciary issues raised by the actions of Attorney General Morales; and (2)
the reasonableness of the attorney fee award. See Texas v. Am. Tobacco Co., No. 5:96-
CV-91 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (affidavit of Lester Brickman)).
59 There are various jurisdictions that require counsel to indicate on a document filed
along with their complaint whether any related litigation has been filed in that court. The
intent is to assign any such "related" case to the judge already hearing the case to which
the new one is "related." Some lawyers use this to their advantage by filing a particular
case first to ensure that subsequent related cases are assigned to the judge that presided
over the initial case. Georgene M. Vairo, Forum Selection: Judge Shopping, NAT'L L.J.,
Nov. 27, 2000, at A16 (describing how judge shopping, unlike forum shopping is
universally condemned because it "tends to undermine public confidence in the judicial
system. Judge-shopping suggests that justice is not impartial."). Other strategies that
counsel have used to better control which judge will be assigned their cases include:
filing suit against the assigned judge to pressure him or her to decline presiding over the
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a tool for social and political reform, the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein of
the Eastern District of New York, is one of the most sought after federal
district court judges in the country by plaintiff lawyers filing mass tort
actions.60 Judge Weinstein has been selected by plaintiffs' lawyers to
preside over several important mass tort litigations.61  By his rulings,
case; making false accusations against judges to force recusal; filing various lawsuits in a
single district and dismissing all of the cases except the one assigned to the plaintiff-
friendly judge; refiling previously dismissed lawsuits in the same or a different forum in
attempting to win their favored judge; and securing a plaintiff-friendly judge with the
assistance of a helpful filing clerk. Id.; see also Weyman I. Lundquist, The New Art of
Forum-Shopping, 11 LITIG. 21, 22 (Spring 1985).
60 Judge Weinstein is "a judge with senior status who is known for unconventional rulings
that often push the limits of tort law." See Bob Van Voris, NY 's Judge-Shopping
Channel: Tobacco and Gun Plaintiffs Steer Cases to a Brooklyn Court, NAT'L L.J., July
26, 1999, at A4; see also Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation:
The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413 (1999)
("Judge Weinstein, famously the federal judge who negotiated the agent orange settlement
and has since managed numerous other mass tort cases, readily analogized mass tort
litigation to the 1960s institutional reform litigation with which he was very familiar.").
As explained by Judge Weinstein:
Mass tort cases are akin to public litigations involving court-ordered
restructuring of institutions to protect constitutional rights. In dealing
with such mass tort cases ... I have sensed an atmosphere similar to
that of public interest cases I have supervised .... Mass tort cases and
public litigations both implicate serious political and sociological
issues. Both are restrained by economic imperatives. Both have
psychological underpinnings. And both affect larger communities than
those encompassed by the litigants before the court.
Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469,
472-74 (1994). Judge Weinstein's activist philosophy is also reflected in his book on
mass tort litigation, in which he states: "by their very nature, these [mass tort] cases
involve unanticipated problems with wide-ranging social and political ramifications. A
judge does not legislate from the bench simply because he or she considers the broadest
implications of his or her decision in such a case. Judges not only may take such a view,
they must." WEINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 92-93 (1995); see also William Glaberson, A
Judge Shows Who's the Boss: Dressing Down Lawyers, and Dressing Up Gigante, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 20, 1997, at 21. "To liberals, [Weinstein] is an emblem of the 1960s notion
that the country's problems can be solved by good intentions and that the legal system can
be a tool for reform. To conservatives, he is the epitome ofjudicial power run amok." Id.
61 Separate groups of plaintiffs' lawyers targeting Big Tobacco
and the gun industry are steering cases to a maverick federal judge in
Brooklyn, N.Y., apparently hoping he will accept novel theories of
industry-wide liability that might not succeed in any other courtroom in
America.
In April, plaintiffs' lawyers quietly filed a nationwide smokers'
class action against seven tobacco industry defendants in the Eastern
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Judge Weinstein has single-handedly changed the course of mass tort
litigation in the federal arena.
62
District of New York. They had gotten the case assigned to Judge Jack
B. Weinstein, a judge with senior status who is known for
unconventional rulings that often push the limits of tort law. Sturgeon
v. Philip Morris Inc., No. 99-1988.
Then on July 12, 1999, the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) announced that it planned
to sue gun manufacturers and distributors throughout the country, in an
effort to change radically the way guns are distributed and sold in the
United States. The intended forum? Judge Weinstein's court.
Judge Weinstein was on the sidelines of the cigarette wars
until asbestos industry lawyers sued Big Tobacco in 1997, trying to
recover a share of the money paid to asbestos workers who smoked.
That case was assigned to Judge Weinstein as a case related to his role
in the asbestos litigation. The cases were seen as related because the
Manville Trust, reformulated under the supervision of Judge Weinstein,
had sued "Big Tobacco" in 1997 in an attempt to recover some of the
damages they paid to claimants alleging lung cancer caused, at least in
part, by exposure to asbestos-containing products, but who also smoked
and had not sued tobacco companies for their injuries because suits
against asbestos defendants were far more successful. Since then three
major tobacco cases, including Sturgeon, have been assigned to Judge
Weinstein, all on the ground that they are related to earlier cases.
Similarly, lawyers representing the NAACP plan to claim that
their case is related to Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802
(E.D.N.Y. 1999), a gun liability case tried in front of Judge Weinstein.
Hamilton, in turn, was assigned to Judge Weinstein based on claims by
plaintiffs' lawyers that it was related to a 1981 gun liability case and a
case over the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES). Id.
Along the way, tobacco and gun defendants have challenged
the assignment of Judge Weinstein, but to no avail. Normally, cases in
the eastern district are assigned at random. When the complaint is filed,
however, plaintiffs' lawyers state whether the case is "related to"
another case in the courthouse.
Van Voris, supra note 60, at A4.
62Judge Weinstein's attempts to change the law with regard to the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of guns failed. In Hamilton, he held that gun manufacturers had a duty to
control the marketing decisions of retailers in the distribution chain. Hamilton, 62 F.
Supp. 2d at 808. This was an unprecedented expansion of existing tort law. See
Patterson & Philpott, supra note 7, at 593. Judge Weinstein was essentially reversed by
the New York Court of Appeals in Hamilton v. Beretta, No. 36, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 946
(N.Y. Apr. 26, 2001), when that court resoundingly answered "no" to two questions
certified to it by the Second Circuit that emanated from Judge Weinstein's ruling in
Hamilton. Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) questions
certified, Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 222 F.3d 36 (2d Cir. 2000), questions
certified answered, No. 36, 2001 N.Y. LEXIS 946 (N.Y. Apr. 26, 2001). The questions
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B. Client Abuses in Mass Tort Litigation
In addition to the foregoing systemic abuses, mass tort litigation
has created a new set of client abuses that current ethical rules are not
63
equipped to address. Many of these abuses are a function of the financial
incentives that motivate the litigation.64 In class action litigation, for
example, plaintiffs' counsel have intrinsic incentives to seek excessive
fees and at the time of settlement to often compromise the interests of the
class in exchange for a defendant's agreement to support (or not to
oppose) such a fee request.65
In addition to promoting systemic abuses and self-interested
behavior, mass tort litigation invites large scale deviation from the
standards of care and conduct owed by the lawyer to the client, including
malpractice, breaches of ethical duties and therefore of the correlative
ethical rights of clients, and breaches of fiduciary obligation-including
the duty not to represent clients with conflicting interests.
66
For example, lawyers may structure a mass tort settlement in order
to maximize their fees.67 In addition, when lawyers receive funds in
settlement of consolidated actions, there is often little or no supervision of
how they allocate the proceeds among their clients-leading to the
possibility that such divisions reflect self-interested behavior-particularly
certified were: "(I) Whether the defendants owed the plaintiffs a duty to exercise
reasonable care in the marketing and distribution of the handguns they manufacture?,
[and] (II) Whether liability in the case could be apportioned on a market share basis, and,
if so, how?" Hamilton, 222 F.3d at 36. For a discussion of the Hamilton cases and of
the failure of negligent marketing claims in firearm litigation, see Anne G. Kimball &
Sarah L. Olson, When All Else Fails, Blame Madison Avenue. Negligent Marketing
Claims in Firearm Litigation, 36 TORTS & INS. L.J. 981 (2001).
63 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the
Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1159, 1189-90 (1995).
64 In class actions and other aggregative forms of litigation, there is a conflict between the
financial interests of the lawyers and the class they represent. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (THIRD) § 23.24 (1995); see also supra notes 9-11.
65 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 74-76 (stating that "plaintiffs' attorneys in class and
derivative cases . . . operate with nearly total freedom from traditional forms of client
monitoring"). Because most settlements are rarely the subject of published judicial
decisions, it is likely that at least some of the most abusive settlements escape attention.
66 For discussion of ethical issues raised by mass tort litigation, see Sarah A. Toops,
Ethically Representing Thousands of Plaintiffs: Conflict Problems in Mass Toxic Harm
Cases, 67 DEF. COUN. J. 462 (2000).
67 See id. at 465-66.
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when the contingency fee percentages of the aggregated clients vary so that
certain allocations yield higher fee monies than others or when the lawyers
use their distributive power to reward claimants such as union officers or
their relatives who were instrumental in recruiting other claimants, or
when the lawyers discriminate in favor of clients in certain jurisdictions at
the expense of other clients living elsewhere. 68
When lawyers represent one class of clients today and other classes
of clients in the future, the opportunistic behavior possibilities collide with
such traditional fiduciary obligations as avoidance of conflicts of interests.
Consider one such intersection of tobacco and asbestos claims found in the
1997 Global Tobacco Settlement (the "Tobacco Settlement"). 69 The
Tobacco Settlement included a provision that prohibited claims against the
tobacco companies by third-party payors70 such as the Manville Trust,71
which was established under the Manville bankruptcy to be the registry for
all tort claims based upon exposure to asbestos-containing products
against the Manville Corporation. Trust payments to claimants from the
Manville Trust are heavily discounted, 72 in part because of the huge
numbers of claimants,73 and also because so much of the Trust's funds
68 See e.g., Eric Felton, The Asbestos Gospel of Baseball's St. Peter, WKLY. STANDARD,
Sept. 18, 1995, at 46; Kate O'Beirne, How Trial Lawyers Bankroll the Democratic Party,
NAT'L REV., Aug. 20, 2001, at 26; Peter Passell, Challenge to Multimillion Dollar
Settlement Threatens Top Texas Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1995, at B6.
69 For an official report of the terms of the prospect settlement, see Proposed Resolution,
June 20, 1997 (on file with author).
70 Id. Tit. VIII(B)(5).
71 For the history of the setting up of the Manville Trust, see Findley v. Blinken (In re
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.), 129 B.R. 710, 752-54, Civ. A. No. 90-3973 (Bankr.
E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also infra note 114.
72 Currently, the Trust will pay five percent of the liquidated value of claims filed with it.
See DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DOCUMENTED BRIEFING,
ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN THE U.S.: A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD ISSUE 35 (2001).
73Future claims reduce the percentage paid of past claims because the percentage of the
full value of claims that the Trust pays is a function of the total number of claims.
Accordingly, plaintiff lawyers routinely violate Model Rule 1.7 when they represent new
clients whose potential awards will be jeopardized by the lawyers' actions to secure full
compensation for their previous clients, as well as violate their fiduciary obligations to
their previous clients because the new clients' claims will reduce the amounts to be
actually paid to the previous clients. See Frank J. Macchiarola, The Manville Personal
Injury Settlement Trust: Lessons for the Future, 17 CARDozO L. REV. 583, 585 (1996).
This problem is illustrated in Findley v. Falise, 878 F. Supp. 473 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1996).
If the attorney was successful in getting the earlier asbestos claims paid in full, there
would be nothing for the later claimants that he also represented. The attorney therefore
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were dissipated in a first round of frenzied profit taking by lawyers.74
Approximately 5-7% of claimants against the Trust have lung cancer. The
dominant cause of lung cancer is cigarette smoking. Asbestos exposure is
regarded as an adjuvant, that is, a factor that increases the likelihood that
cigarette smoking will result in lung cancer. Lawsuits seeking damages
for lung cancer are usually brought against former asbestos product
manufacturers rather than tobacco companies because of the difficulty, at
least to this point, in suing the latter. The Trust has been pursuing claims
against the tobacco companies to recoup the cost of payout to lung cancer
victims and thereby add assets that will enable higher payout amounts to
claimants against the Trust. The Tobacco Settlement was negotiated by
many of the same lawyers who represented and continued to represent lung
cancer claimants against the Manville Trust. In negotiating the Tobacco
Settlement, these lawyers agreed to a provision prohibiting third party
payor claims against the tobacco companies even though it was
diametrically opposed to the interests of their asbestos clients. In
permitting this provision in the Tobacco Settlement, these attorneys agreed
to foreclose their former clients' ability to recover greater compensation.
Elsewhere than in the world of mass tort litigation, this would be seen as a
conflict of interest.75
Another self-interested strategy that lawyers use in mass tort-type
proceedings is to maximize fee income at the expense of some clients by
structuring Federal Rule 42 consolidations or state equivalents thereof to
include a small number of seriously injured claimants in a much larger
group of lesser injured or arguably non-injured claimants. Empirical
evidence indicates that such aggregations often lead to lower claim values
for the seriously injured claimant and much higher claim values than
would otherwise be the case for the lesser injured claimant. 76 Moreover,
had an ethical obligation to disclose this conflict of interest to his clients and secure their
waiver, which of course, he did not do.
74 Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1835 n.62 (estimating that lawyers
paid themselves between $226,600,000 and $306,000,000 at the rate of $5,000 an hour
for the administrative task of settling the first round of claims against the Trust, in groups
of hundreds and thousands).
75 The fact that the prohibition against the Trust bringing suit did not ultimately survive
does not exonerate the asbestos/tobacco lawyers from having placed their financial self-
interest above that of their clients' interests.
76 See Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence:
Tort System Outcomes are Principally Determined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15
CARDOzoL. REv. 1755, 1783-84 (1994). This article states that:
In mass consolidations, one of the specific mechanisms by which higher
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by diluting the plaintiff class with less injured people, plaintiffs' attorneys
are transferring money that would have gone to the seriously injured had
the others not been in the class. As Professors Carrington and Apanovitch
have observed:
[T]he guesswork associated with mass tort aggregation
action settlement effects a substantial modification of the
property rights of class members. The modification of
rights from those that can be enforced at trial to those that
will be measured by weak conjecture effects a transfer of
wealth from class members with clearly meritorious claims
to those whose claims are more dubious. Intangible
property rights are thus modified by any law conferring
authority on a court to approve en masse a settlement of
personal injury claims.77
This strategic positioning by plaintiff lawyers is done because it
yields far higher contingency fee income than if the aggregations were
limited to claims of similar severity.78  While the fact of such self-
interested behavior has been noted by some scholars, there has been little
focus on whether such lawyer conduct breaches the ethical and fiduciary
valuations are created is the lumping together in one or more minitrials
which are often a part of a mass consolidation, the claims of a few
seriously injured claimants who merit substantial compensation with the
claims of many who are unimpaired. In such circumstances juries
apparently "lend" some of their sympathy for the seriously injured
claimants to those who are unimpaired and significantly under
compensate the seriously injured while substantially overcompensating
those who are unimpaired. In the aggregate, however, the total
valuation for the claims far exceeds what individual trials would yield.
Id. at 1783-84; see also Weinstein, supra note 60. Weinstein argues that:
[C]onsolidations do tend to encourage the commencement of suits of
questionable merit. Since consolidated cases probably will be settled in
large groups, the less defensible claims are likely to obtain more than
they would if they were litigated (assuming they would have been
brought at all), while the more serious claims will probably be settled
for less then they Would in individual suits.
Id. at 480.
77 Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 471.
78 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 64 (noting that "mixing the case for trial and
settlement may result in a lower recovery for the more seriously injured, but generally it
will result in a quicker fee for counsel").
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obligations of the lawyer to severely injured clients who receive less so
that their lawyers may receive more.
Another abusive technique that lawyers use to avoid the even
meager fee superintendence that is involved in class actions is to aggregate
hundreds and even thousands of individual cases into a single proceeding
and then settle those claims en masse. Lawyers are then able to charge
retail prices-standard contingency fees of 33?-40% and higher-against
wholesale settlements, insulated from any ethical oversight.79
Still another abuse occurs when plaintiffs' counsel enter into
aggregate settlements with a defendant without the informed consent of
their clients. 80 In an aggregate settlement, the defendant provides a lump
sum of money for distribution to the claimants in the sole discretion of
plaintiffs' counsel.8' It is thus a zero sum game; whatever one client
receives is at the expense of the other clients. Because of the conflicting
interests of the clients, both the Model Rules and the Model Code require
that each participant in an aggregate settlement must be informed of the
nature of the settlement and give his or her informed consent to the
distribution as determined by counsel.81 Nonetheless, as aggregate
79 See In re Polybutylene Plumbing Litig., 23 S.W.3d 428 (Tex. App. 2000), where the
appellate court gave its blessing to the enforcement of 37,100 individual fee contracts,
most of them providing for a 40% contingency fee, totaling $88.8 million in attorneys'
fees, and reversing the district court's treatment of the case as in effect a class action. The
lower court also had reduced the fee total to 20% for the cases that did not go to trial, and
awarded a total fee of $33.1 million (a $55.7 million reduction).
80 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 63, at 1181 (noting that "mass tort lawyers have long
been settling 'inventories' of cases in which they settle for large amounts of 'fixed funds'
and then allocate specific awards themselves to individual plaintiffs"). For an account of
an aggregated settlement found to have violated Rule 1.8(g), see Arce v. Burrow, 958
S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App. .1997).
81 See generally Joshua H. Threadcraft, Note, The Class Action Settlement.- When the
Good Can Become the Bad and the Ugly, 25 J. LEGAL PROF. 227 (2001).
82 MODELRULES OF PROF'LCONDUCT R. 1.8(g) (1983):
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in
making an aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients..
. unless each client consents after consultation, including disclosure of
the existence and nature of all the claims involved and of the
participation of each person in the settlement.
See also DR 5-106 (22 NYCRR § 1200.25), entitled "Settling Similar Claims of Clients:"
A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not make or
participate in the making of an aggregate settlement of the claims of or
against the clients, unless each client has consented after full disclosure
of the implications of the aggregate settlement and the advantages and
risks involved, including the existence and nature of all the claims
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settlements have become more common, the application of ethical rules to
aggregate settlements has become less common.
83
The final abusive element of mass tort litigation that I will discuss
is a reprise of my earlier discussion of the conflict of interest that lawyers
face when they represent a large group of claimants alleging injury due to
exposure to a toxic substance such as asbestos. When these claims include
both presently injured claimants and potential claimants whose injuries
have not yet-and may not ever-manifest themselves, such
representation is tainted by an irremediable conflict of interest. The issue
arises in its most pronounced form as the "settlement class action," a
device based upon Federal Rule 23 that the United States Supreme Court
essentially rejected in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor84 and in Ortiz v.
Fibreboard Corp.,8 5 primarily because of the inherent conflict between the
interests of present claimants and future claimants and the conflicting
loyalties of the attorneys for the present claimants who purported to also
represent the interest of the future claimants.
When proposed amendments to Rule 23 were published in March
1996,86 which included a proposal to legitimate Rule 23 settlement
involved and the participation of each person in the settlement.
83 Menkel-Meadow, supra note 63, at 1181 n.93. Judge Weinstein has acknowledged
that although aggregate settlements violate ethical rules, judges encourage them in order
to rid their docket of many cases:
Even though bulk settlements may technically violate ethical rules,
judges often encourage their acceptance to terminate a large number of
cases. The defendants generally prefer them because they save
transaction costs and usually result in savings per case. Plaintiffs'
counsel like them because they generally do not reduce their percentage
fee per case so that, because of the large settlement amounts, their
lawyer's hourly fees jump spectacularly.
WEINSTEIN, supra note 21, at 74.
84 521 U.S. 591 (1997), aff'g 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), decision below, 878 F. Supp.
716 (E.D. Pa. 1994); see also Flanagan v. Ahearn, 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998); see
generally Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem
Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995) (discussing unethical behavior of class
counsel).
85 27 U.S. 815 (1999). Ortiz also involved the issue of whether the class action
settlement qualified as a "limited fund." George M. Cohen, The "Fair" Is the Enemy of
the Good: Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation and Class Action Settlements, 8 SuP. CT.
ECON. REv. 23 (2000).
86 Committee Note, Proposed Rules: Amendments to Federal Rules, Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23. Class Actions, 167 F.R.D.
523 (1996).
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classes,87 the academic community condemned the proposal.88 Let me
offer a distinct view from that of the academic community and the
Supreme Court. Of course, lawyers in these two cases sold out the
interests of potential future claimants in exchange for huge fees for settling
their inventory of current claimants. Where I differ from the academics
and the Court is that such actions cannot violate the rights of future
claimants. To explain how I have come to this conclusion, I will first need
to paint a picture of modem asbestos litigation.8 9
Today, perhaps 80% or more of the 70,000 asbestos claims that
have been brought in the past year are on behalf of uninjured persons, so-
called "exposure only" cases and a new generation of asbestosis claims. 90
87 For a discussion of the proposed amendments, see Darren M. Franklin, The Mass Tort
Defendants Strike Back. Are Settlement Class Actions A Collusive Threat or Just a
Phantom Menace?, 53 STAN. L. REv. 163 (2000).
88 See Eric D. Green, Advancing Individual Rights Through Group Justice, 30 U.C.
DAVIs L. REv. 791, 794 (1997). Recent efforts to introduce settlement classes into the
regime of Rule 23 "set off a firestorm of opposition by the academic community" leading
more than 120 law professors to organize a steering committee to oppose the changes. Id.
89For a description of asbestos litigation, see generally Brickman, Asbestos Litigation,
supra note 10; Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Claims Management Act of 1991: A
Proposal to the United States Congress, 13 CARDOzO L. REv. 1891 (1992); Effects of
Asbestos Injury Litigation on Federal and State Court Systems. Hearings Before the
Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administrations of the House
Judiciary Comm., 102nd Cong., 1st (1991) (statement of Lester Brickman).90
The number of unimpaired "exposure only" pleural plaque claims, see infra note 93,
has been far eclipsed in the past several years by a huge increase in the number of
asbestosis claims brought on behalf of unimpaired persons. Asbestosis is defined infra
note 112; the proposition that huge numbers of asbestos claims are being brought on
behalf of unimpaired claimants is set forth in the infra text accompanying notes 112-36.
Overall, asbestos claiming activity has increased substantially in recent years-
more than doubling in the past five years. The huge increase appears to be a function of
the beginning of the end game in asbestos litigation. Plaintiff lawyers fear that the
defendants they anointed in the mid-1980s to take the place of the Johns-Manville
Corporation are on the verge of extinction-most have filed for bankruptcy and as for the
few that have not yet done so, it is only a matter of time. Attempts to inculpate so-called
non-traditional defendants such as Ford Motor Co., Pfizer, Dana (an auto parts
manufacturer), Viacom (as successor to parts of Westinghouse Electric Corp.), Dow
Chemical, 3M, Georgia-Pacific, IBM, AT&T, and Sears have sputtered along, athough
recent litigation against Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. and Halliburton has been quite
successful. See Richard B. Schmitt How Plaintiff Lawyers Have Turned Asbestos into a
Court Perennial, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2001 at Al; J. David Isaac, Asbestos Claims Run
Amok: Is Halliburton Next Victim?, INVESTORs Bus. DAILY, Jan. 23, 2002, at A18; see
also Gregory Zuckerman, Specter of Costly Asbestos Litigation Haunts Companies,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 27, 2000 at Cl; Editorial, Lawyers Torch the Economy, WALL ST. J.,
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It is important to emphasize at the outset that without these claims, the
"asbestos litigation crisis" would never have arisen and would not exist
today. These claimants have a work history that includes exposure to
asbestos-containing products. Though most "exposure only" claimants
have no symptomatology, no impaired lung function, 9 1 no restrictions on
movement, etc., their claims are supported by medical testimony 92 that
exposure has resulted in the formation of "pleural plaques" which are
areas of thickening of the pleura of the lungs that are observable on x-
rays.93 Moreover, while there is often expert testimony that the exposed
claimants are therefore more likely to contract an asbestos related disease
than non-exposed persons, there is no credible medical evidence to support
that testimony. Nonetheless, while some jurisdictions hold that therefore
there is no injury, other jurisdictions hold that there is enough "injury" to
get the case to the jury and to thus enter the asbestos lottery sweepstakes
where some are awarded zero and some get millions and lawyers, because
of the huge numbers of such claimants, get hundreds of millions.
94
Here then is how a typical "exposure only" case arises. First, the
client is recruited. Often this is done through a union intermediary.95 Let
Apr. 6, 2001, at A14 ("[T]he net has stretched from asbestos makers to companies far
removed from the scene of any punitive wrongdoing."). While "there is reason to believe
that non-traditional defendants are paying an increasing share of the costs to resolve
asbestos injury claims," HENSLER, supra note 72, at 11, it is yet unclear whether the
attempts to inculpate a whole new set of defendants will succeed. Plaintiff lawyers,
however, fearing that the end game may have begun, are rushing to bring new claims
against the traditional defendants before all of their assets are totally dissipated. See also
infra note 151.
91 For an account of how lung function tests are manipulated to produce "positive"
results, that is, to indicate impaired lung function, see infra note 110.
92 There is ample reason to conclude that much medical testimony presented in asbestos
litigation is specious. See infra notes 110-141.
93See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1852.
94 Id. at 1855-59.
95 See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1853-54; see also In re Joint E. &
S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 748 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (working "[in
conjunction with unions, [plaintiffs' lawyers] have arranged through the use of medical
trailers and the like to have x-rays taken of thousands of workers without manifestations
of disease and then filed complaints for those that had any hint of pleural plaque"); Eagle-
Picher Indus. v. Am. Employers' Ins. Co., 718 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (D. Mass 1989)
(stating that "many of these cases result from mass x-ray screening at occupational
locations conducted by unions and/or plaintiffs' attorneys, and many claimants are
functionally asymptomatic when suit is filed"); Christine Biederman et al., Toxic Justice,
DALLAS OBSERVER, Aug. 13, 1998, available at http://www.dallasobserver.co
m/issues/1998-08-13/feature.htmlpagel.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2001):
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us assume that the claimant-to-be is a former construction worker who
worked on multiple sites. In order to "process" his claim, it will be
necessary to establish that he was exposed to large quantities of asbestos-
containing materials in friable or breathable form, the specific products to
which he was exposed, and the nature of the consequent injury.96  Those
requirements are met in the following fashion.
After being recruited, upon his first visit to the law firm, a
Asbestos workers often find their way to [a leading Texas law
firm which specializes in asbestos litigation, hereinafter, the "Firm"] ...
after a health screening arranged by another law firm and a trade union.
Together, the union and the local law firm round up a group of the
skilled laborers who constitute [the Firm's] ... clientele, sending out
notice of the free screening. The men, many of whom know someone
who died from asbestos disease, come from miles around.
According to trial testimony from doctors, the union and the
law firm pay for a lung doctor to examine up to 200 men a day using
equipment rented from a local hospital or hauled in by the doctor in a
tractor-trailer rig. The union men are X-rayed, and the films are usually
developed on the spot. Frequently, an attorney is standing by to sign up
anyone whose examinations show any evidence of asbestos exposure.
After the workers are X-rayed and referred to a lawyer, the
local attorney typically sends the case to [the Firm] .... (According to
[a principal of the Firm] . . . the referring firm usually gets up to one-
third of [the Firm's] ... 40 percent contingency fee.)
Biederman et al., supra, at 14.
For commentary on the 40% contingency fee, see supra note 10. The use of
medical screenings to amass large numbers of claimants is not restricted to asbestos-
related claims:
Lawyers find potential clients through advertisements that offer "free
screenings" and consultations. A typical advertisement this month in
the Fayette Chronicle appealed to Jefferson County residents who had
used two popular arthritis drugs.
"If you or someone you know has taken Vioxx or Celebrex and suffered
any serious side effects (including death, heart attack, stroke, seizure,
kidney and liver damage, pregnancy complications, birth defects or
high blood pressure), you may have a claim!" the advertisement said.
"Contact Stamps & Stamps, attorneys at law, to discuss your legal
rights."
Robert Pear, Mississippi Gaining As Lawsuit Mecca, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at Al.
96 As for proximate cause, that step is basically finessed by evidence ofexposure and
medical testimony, which is always available, that exposure can lead to an asbestos-
related disease. The jury then fills in the missing link by concluding that there is
causation. See infra note 142.
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paralegal 97 will quiz him about his work history-what projects he worked
on and what products he was exposed to. Assume, as is likely the case,
that the would-be claimant has insufficient recollection of work sites 20-
40 years in the past, let alone the products used at that site. To overcome
this defect, the law firm will file a request with the Social Security
Administration on behalf of the claimant for his work history.98 Assume
then the paralegal now has the Social Security work history summary.
Selecting a particular work site, say one from the early 1960s, the
paralegal will ask what asbestos containing products were used at that site.
Assume, as is likely the case, that the would-be claimant has no
recollection. The paralegal will then consult the law firm's extensive data
base99 and then indicate: "Charlie and Ed worked at that site-you
remember them, of course, and they have testified that there were five
specific asbestos containing products used at that site in those years."'
100
97 Because of the high volume of asbestos claims and the automated nature of the claim
preparation process, most if not all of the intake is done by paralegals. The claimant will
typically not see a lawyer until the actual deposition. See Thomas Korosec, Homefryin'
with Fred Baron, Dallas' Largest Plaintiff's Firm, Baron & Budd, Cultivates Friends,
Punishes Enemies and Beats Allegations It Prompts Clients to Lie and Win, DALLAS
OBSERVER, Mar. 29, 2001, available at http://www.dallasobserver.com/issues/2001-03-
29/feature.htrnl/pagel.html (last visited Dec. 1 2001) (describing the firm's "high-volume
legal assembly line," which consisted of seventy lawyers and 400 paralegals who move
"tens of thousands of asbestos claims through the courts").
98 According to a paralegal that had worked at the Firm, the methods used by the Firm's
product-identification staff included "start[ing] with a printout from the Social Security
Administration listing every job the workers ever held. She would set up a meeting with
the clients, usually at their homes, and she would spend weeks on the road traveling from
interview to interview." Biederman et al., supra note 95, at 18.
99 See Korosec, supra note 97 (indicating that the Firm keeps a database on what asbestos
products were used at various workplaces).
100 From here on in this hypothetical exposure-only claim development description, I am
relying in part on a memorandum used by the firm in Texas and possibly elsewhere to
"prepare" exposure-only claimants for depositions, which was inadvertently produced in
response to a discovery request (on file with author). See testimony of Eugene Cook,
former justice of the Texas Supreme Court; In re All Asbestos-Related Personal Injury or
Death Cases Filed or To Be Filed in Bexar County, Texas, No. 94-CI-10078, 285 Jud.
Dist. Bexar Cty. Dist. Ct., Oct. 20, 1997, at 73 (describing the Script Memo as "a cancer
in the legal system"). The Script Memo has been the subject of extensive discussion.
See, e.g., Abner et al. v. Elliot, 85 Ohio St. 3d 11 (Ct. App., Mar. 17, 1999); In re Beverly
Jean Brown et al., No. 03-97-00609-CV (Tex. Ct. App., Jan. 29. 1998) (unpub. op.);
Michael Saul, Grand Jury Doesn't Act Against Law Firm that Had Been Accused of
Coaching Clients, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 17, 1998, at 22A; Lester Brickman &
Ronald Rotunda, When Witnesses Are Told What To Say, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1998, at
A15; Witness Preparation Memos Raise Questions About Ethical Limits, [Current
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The paralegal will then show the claimant pictures of the bags and boxes
in which the products were contained, fill out a "work history sheet"
listing the products to which the claimant was exposed'0 1 and instruct the
claimant to memorize the details on the product label (as provided)
because later the claimant will take a "test" in which he has to identify the
Reports] Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) at 48-54 (February 18, 1998);
Charles Silver, Preliminary Thoughts on the Economics of Witness Preparation, 30 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1383, 1398-1401 (1999); W. William Hodes, The Professional Duty to
Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the Bounds of the Law, 30 TEX. TECH L. REv.
1343 (1999); Bob Van Voris, A Cautionary Tale, Client Memo Embarrasses Dallas
Firm, Baron & Budd Coaching of Witnesses Called Improper, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 13, 1997,
at Al.
101 See Biederman et al., supra note 95:
The case then goes to [the Firm's] . . . foot soldiers, the
product- identification paralegals. These mostly young women make
the initial face-to-face contact with the clients. They help the clients
draft work histories and show them the "picture books" from which the
clients, in theory, pick out the products they recall using.
The paralegals have the primary contact with the workers,
helping them prepare their answers and readying them for deposition
and possible trial. ("Depo prep," as it is called at the firm, is an
essential part of the process. By [a principal of the Finn's] . . . own
estimate, about 97 percent of the cases [the Firm]. . . files do not go to
trial, so the answer the workers give during depositions can play an
important role in determining whether they get a settlement.)
Paralegals say-and neither [of the two principles of the Firm]
• . . denies-that workers are selectively shown pictures of asbestos
products they should identify. Kuntze [the paralegal] says that in
meetings with clients, she would bring a "3-or 4-or 5-inch binder with
pictures of asbestos products, divided up according to manufacturer.
I'd go through page by page and encourage the client to recall the
products they used. It would be pretty strong encouragement. Most of
the time when I left, I had ID for every manufacturer that we needed to
get ID for."
She already had the answers, she says. Kuntze just needed the
worker to agree she had the correct ones. Most would wise up pretty
quickly, she says. "Clients understood that products need to be ID'd for
the manufacturers we sued," she says.
Id. at 15, 18; see also Korosec, supra note 97 (The article describes an interview with a
former paralegal at the Firm in which the paralegal "says he was pretty good at his job [of
finding witnesses to support claims] and he'd usually end up getting many men to say
many things they had no idea about before he called. 'I'd get 'em to identify every one,'
he says of his list of 20 or more products.").
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products and if he passes the test, he will be rewarded financially. °2 He is
also instructed that if asked at the test, that is, at the deposition, if he saw
any warning labels, to answer: "No."'
10 3
He is also instructed to say that there were certain products with
which he did not come into contact.10 4 These, of course, are the products
of companies that have entered into bankruptcy and hence any portion of
the product exposure that is attributed to these companies will only be paid
at 5-10% on the dollar.
10 5
102 "[Y]ou must study your work history sheets [that I have prepared for you] Over and
Over and Over. . . How well you know the name of each product and how you were
exposed to it will determine whether that defendant will want to offer you a settlement."
Script Memo, supra note 100, at 1. The Script Memo then goes on to describe in detail
the various asbestos-containing products used at specific work sites, and how the product
was used. Id. at 2-12. The claimant is instructed to say "you saw the NAMES [of the
product] on the BAGS." Id. at 2. "The more often you were around the product [as
indicated by your testimony], the better for your case." Id. The claimant is also told to
know the names of his co-workers who have been designated as his witnesses, including
being able to describe their appearance. Id. at 1. Finally, he is instructed to "[s]tudy
hard, memorize as much as you can and practice saying all the product names out loud."
Id. at 19.
103 "You will be asked if you ever saw any WARNING labels on container of asbestos. It
is important to maintain that you NEVER saw labels on asbestos products that said
WARNING or DANGER. You might even be asked to spell 'WARNING' or
'DANGER' to prove you would know what it meant if you saw it." Id. at 14. He is also
instructed that if asked whether he ever used respiratory equipment to protect him from
asbestos, the answer is "No" even if he did wear a mask for welding or other fumes. Id.
104 "Do not mention product names that are not listed on your Work History Sheets." Id.
at 15; see also Biederman et al., supra note 95, at 19 (indicating that a paralegal at the
firm stated that "her supervisors, two lawyers, told her to discourage identification of
Johns-Manville products because the Manville Trust was not paying claims rendered
against it at the time"); HENSLER, supra note 72 (indicating that Manville Trust claims
today are being paid at 5 percent of their liquidated value).
105 At the time of the Johns-Manville bankruptcy in 1982, plaintiffs had testified that
Manville's products constituted 75-80% of the asbestos-containing products used at the
U.S. Navy shipyards. However, once the bankruptcy took place, the larger the Johns-
Manville share of the asbestos-containing products to which plaintiffs alleged exposure,
the less the value of any judgment because judgments against Manville were all stayed for
a significant period and then heavily discounted due to the bankruptcy. A sea change in
plaintiffs' testimony then took place and the Johns-Manville share of the asbestos-
containing products used at the work sites, ten, twenty and thirty years earlier, dropped
dramatically. One witness who had apparently not sufficiently studied his script, testified
after the bankruptcy that "basically, most of the material, Johns-Manville, I'm sure, was
used on all of them." He then quickly added: "I wasn't supposed to mention that, was I?"
Andrew T. Berry, Asbestos Personal Injury Compensation and The Tort System: Beyond
"Fix It Cause It's Broke," 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 1949, 1951 n.9.
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He will also be told that the attorneys who will be administering
the test will have no way of knowing what products were used on that job
site so that anything the claimant says is not subject to challenge. 106 The
inference is obvious and I need not spell it out for you.0 7 In addition, he
will be told never to mention the Script Memo, which has been provided
to him. 
08
He will also be told that he will have to testify about how his
health has been affected by his exposure. Let me read to you a sample of
the instructions that have been used in this regard:
This part of your deposition is about your health. It is very
IMPORTANT that you give concrete examples of how your
life has been "damaged" by your exposure to asbestos.
While the answers to questions about your work history and
the products you were exposed to should be as SHORT as
possible, THIS part of your deposition is YOUR
opportunity to state, for the record, why you DESERVE to
be compensated for damage to your health caused by
asbestos. The defense attorneys will not ask as many
questions about your health. It will be up to YOU to give
as many examples as you can.
SHORTNESS OF BREATH. Think about it. There are
very few things in life, which are not affected by your
ability to breathe. Between now and your deposition, be
thinking about all the activities you have given up or must
do more slowly because of shortness of breath. Some
examples might be:
Do you have trouble sleeping at night because it is difficult
to breathe lying down?
Do you sleep propped up with pillows or sitting up in a
chair in order to breathe easier?
106 Script Memo, supra note 100, at 12.
107See Korosec, supra note 97 (describing the interview previously referred to supra
note 101, stating that the paralegal "recalls being uncomfortable from the start with telling
witnesses how to testify. 'What I was doing was fraudulent. There was never any doubt
in my mind about it."').
108 Script Memo, supra note 100, at 14.
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Do you wake frequently at night to cough or do you wake
up in the morning coughing?
Do you take medications for breathing or anxiety or any
other health problem? Bring ALL your medications along
with you to the deposition so the Court Reporter can type
the names onto the. record, even if you don't take the
medications regularly.
You will be asked how much money you have spent on
asbestos-related health problems. Since there is really no
way to know exactly, it is best to say that your DOCTOR
will have to answer that question ....
WORK: Your ability to support your family and yourself
has always been very important to you. The wages you have
lost by not being able to work as long as you would have
liked to are solid proof that you have been damaged
financially by exposure to asbestos. Some examples of
financial. "damage" you have incurred from lost wages
might be:
Did you have to retire early because you could not keep up
with the other workers your age?
Did you take a lower-paying position because you could no
longer perform the strenuous tasks that typically pay more
money? Have you turned down any overtime? Be thinking
about how much money you have lost by having to refuse
overtime, retire early or take a lower paying job.
HOUSEHOLD MAINTENANCE: The household repairs
you can no longer do yourself or must PAY SOMEONE
ELSE to do is another way to prove you have been
"damaged" by asbestos exposure.
Do you pay someone else to mow your yard? If so, how
much do you pay?, Did you purchase a rider mower
because you just couldn't use a push mower anymore?
2001]
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How big a yard do you mow?
Have you given up growing a vegetable garden? Do you
have a much smaller garden than you used to? How big did
your garden used to be? How small is it now? Have you
lost any money by not being able to sell the extra produce?
Do you pay SOMEONE ELSE to do household repairs such
as plumbing, electrical and roof repairs? Did you have gas
heat installed because you can no longer cut firewood? Did
you have aluminum siding put on because you don't have
the energy to paint anymore? Can you think of more?
HOBBIES: The hobbies you once enjoyed gave meaning to
your life. You worked all your life looking forward to
retirement so you could enjoy them!
Have you given up or cut down on hunting, fishing,
camping, boating, softball, golfing, travel, raising animals
or any other activities you once enjoyed? Name as many as
you can think of.
FAMILY: Your relationship with your family is one of
your greatest joys in life.
Are you spending less time with young children or
grandchildren because they make you too tired or irritable?
Would your spouse and other relatives say that you are
short-tempered or easily frustrated because you are not able
to do the things you once enjoyed?
Has your sex life been affected by shortness of breath?
ANXIETY: It is natural to be afraid about how your future
will be affected by your health. Your fear is caused in part
by health problems you might not have had if you had not
been exposed to asbestos.
Are you depressed because of all the activities you have had
280 [Vol.26:243
LAWYERS' ETHICS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
to give up or cut down on?
Are you afraid that your asbestos disease might develop
into cancer?
Do you wonder if your life will be cut short by asbestos-
related disease and you will leave your family with no one
to provide for them?
Have you seen or heard about co-workers who have died
from asbestos-related disease? Are you afraid the same
thing will happen to you? If you are afraid YOU MUST
SAY SO!...
Can you think of other ways your life has been affected by
your exposure to asbestos? This is YOUR DAY IN
COURT, so to speak, although you won't actually be in a
courtroom. It is YOUR opportunity to STATE FOR THE
RECORD how your life has been "damaged" by these
asbestos manufacturers
If you can give good, concrete examples of how your life
has been damaged by your exposure to asbestos products
made by these manufacturers they will want to offer you a
settlement instead of taking a chance that a jury will award
you more money.
Study hard, memorize as much as you can and practice
saying all the product names out loud. The more you
practice the more you will remember when you are under
stress at your deposition. Try not to worry. Your
deposition will be over before you know it! 109
Now let me go on to discuss how the medical evidence that is used
to support the claim is produced. A pulmonary function test ("PFT") will
be done and will usually show that there has been some loss in lung
109 Id. at 17-19.
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function. 10 A chest x-ray will have been done and a medical doctor will
110 In some cases where impaired lung function is claimed, it is evidenced by a PFT test,
which measures total lung capacity, forced vital capacity, and diffuision capacity by
blowing into a tube as forcefully as possible. Any failure on the part of the claimant to
blow into the tube as forcefully as possible can result in "evidence" of impaired lung
function. However, the test administrator is required to note whether the patient has used
"poor effort." In 1996, Owens-Coming-Fiberglass, Inc. ("OCF") filed suit in federal
court in Louisiana against several businesses that were established to administer
pulmonary function tests to would-be asbestos claimants. See First Amended Complaint,
Owens-Coming v. Glenn E. Pitts, Jewel D. Pitts, Larry M. Mitchell, M.D., Leon
Hammonds, Robert Colgan, Pulmonary Advisory Services, Inc., Pulmonary Advisory
Services of Louisiana, Inc., and Pulmonary Testing Services, Inc., Civil Action No. 96-
2095 (E.D. La., filed Aug. 14, 1998). The PFT enterprises were set up by an accountant
with no medical training or experience in pulmonary testing. See Deposition of Glenn
Pitts (a principal of the testing enterprises), Jackson, Mississippi, April 21, 1997 at 38-40,
taken in Scott v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. et al., No. 74-681 (34th Judicial Dist. For
Parish of St. Bernard, La., filed Aug. 1, 1994). Pitts states that he went into the PFT
testing business because of the "big potential out there . . . ." Id. at 62. Much of the
original business that the enterprises received was from law firms that wanted the
enterprises to do retesting of would-be clients. Id. at 83-84. The x-ray work was
performed at a chiropractic clinic across the street from the shopping center where one of
the testing enterprises was located. Id. at 49. In August 1998, OCF filed its First
Amended Complaint in this matter [hereinafter OCF, First Amended Complaint]. In it,
OCF charged that defendants manipulated the administration of PFT tests in order to
obtain false positive results, and alleged that:
In tens of thousands of cases, Defendants, with the intent to defraud
Owens Coming, systematically and deliberately deviated from [the]
established [PFT testing] standards in order to create false "positive"
PFT results, i.e., results, which falsely indicate pulmonary impairment.
Specifically, Defendants, in performing spirometric PFTs:
* Systematically disregarded the well-established PFT
requirement that, in order to produce valid PFT
results, each subject must exhale for at least 6
seconds;
* Systematically disregarded the well-established PFT
requirement that, in order to produce valid PFT
results, each subject must be administrated three
reproducible tests;
* Systematically disregarded the well-established PFT
requirement that, in order to produce valid PFT
results, each subject must be retested if the
variability of his two highest test results exceeds 5%;
* Repeatedly instructed individuals not to exhale
forcibly, as required to produce valid PFT results;
* Repeatedly instructed technicians to prevent the
computerized PFT equipment from producing
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read the x-ray to see if there are pleural plaques visible. In many cases,
reading the x-ray is like taking a Rorschacht test; whatever is there is
totally in the eye of the beholder."' Not surprisingly, therefore, the reader
readily available data demonstrating the gross
inadequacy of the tests being performed; and
Repeatedly instructed technicians to produce PFT
reports that disguise the testing procedures used to
generate the false-positive results.
OCF, First Amended Complaint 4.
OCF further alleged (and supplied documentary evidence in support) that these
enterprises charged the attorneys who supplied most of the test-takers $700 if the tests
were positive for diminished lung function but only $400 if the tests were negative. Id.
38. See Bill sent by Pulmonary Testing Services of LA, Inc. to Maples & Lomax, a
Mississippi law firm, stating charges of $700 each for 33 positive test-takers and $400
apiece for 34 negative test takers, Mar. 15, 1993 (on file with author); a Bill dated May
10, 1993 stating 49 positive test takers at $700 apiece and 20 negative test takers at $400
apiece (copy of exhibit on file with author).
The complaint further alleged that in cases where test takers were not
represented by an attorney at the time of the testing but then tested "positive," the
enterprises referred those individuals to plaintiffs' asbestos law firms which had
established relationships with the testing enterprises and which had agreed in advance
with the testing enterprises to pay for the tests done on unrepresented individuals who
produced "positive" PFT results. OCF, First Amended Complaint 39.
The complaint further alleged that several union officials were on the payroll of
one or more of the testing enterprises. Id. 40.
The complaint further alleged that at one point in time, the testing enterprises
had entered into fee splitting arrangements with certain plaintiffs' asbestos law firms. Id.
40. One such arrangement involved a 15% contingency fee paid attorney for which the
enterprise did PFTs. See Deposition of Glenn Pitts, supra, at 132-35, 198.
The complaint further alleged that over a period of a few years, the testing
enterprises were paid millions of dollars for their services. OCF, First Amended
Complaint, 43.
OCF apparently discontinued this lawsuit when it entered into a global
settlement with asbestos attorneys.
IIIOne of the ways in which the claims of unimpaired persons are monetized is through
the testimony of medical experts. There is ample reason to believe that much medical
testimony presented in asbestos litigation is specious. See, Brickman, Asbestos
Litigation, supra note 10, at 1847 n.120. Dr. Robert Jones, an expert in internal and
pulmonary medicine, has testified to the effect that "most asbestos-related disease claims
are specious because they are manufactured for the purpose of litigation... A lot of the
claims in this case had been fabricated specifically to bring to court and to enrich
attorneys." See Abadie et al. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co, 784 So. 46, 47 (La. Ct. App.
2001). "Courts have acknowledged the tendency of medical screeners to depart from
accepted medical standards by diagnosing asbestos-related 'injuries' that fail to meet
minimum diagnostic criteria set by the American Thoracic Society of the American
Medical Association, which has no affiliation with or control by defendants." Schwartz &
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will virtually always conclude that there are pleural plaques.
In addition to pleural plaque claims, there have been very large
increases in the number of asbestosis claims 1 2 brought on behalf of
unimpaired claimants. Indeed, much medical evidence presented in
support of asbestosis claims also suffers from the same malady as the
evidence produced in support of pleural plaque claims. A United States
District Court judge, using impartial medical expects and excluding the
Lorber, supra note 27, at 252-53 (citation omitted).
112 Asbestosis is interstitial lung fibrosis, or scarring, caused by asbestos. See Andrew
Chung, Nonneoplastic Disease Caused by Asbestos, in PATHOLOGY OF OCCUPATIONAL
DISEASE 313 (Andrew Churg & Francis H.Y. Green eds., 2d ed. 1998). For a discussion
of asbestosis, see Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1846 n. 112. Out of
221,375 personal injury Proofs of Claim filed by the July 30, 2001 Bar Date in the
Babcock & Wilcox bankruptcy, 176,982 (80%) asserted an asbestosis claim. Babcock &
Wilcox's Report to the Court Regarding Asbestos Developments Generally and the
Proofs of Claims Filed Here at 50, In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., Civ. No. 00-0558,
Bankr. Case No. 00-10992 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2001). Of these, the vast majority,
130,945, showed no clinical impairment. Id. The sheer number of the claims asserted in
the post-petition period is especially indicative in view of the fact that in the prior two
decades, a total of 410,000 asbestos-related claims were submitted to Babcock & Wilcox.
Id. at 49. The huge increases in asbestosis claims being brought on behalf of unimpaired
claimants has been attributed to the massive Georgine settlement which was invalidated in
Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3rd Cir. 1996), and in Amchem
Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), aff'g 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996),
decision below, 878 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1994). Under the terms of that settlement,
future pleural plaque claims were awarded no compensation, see Babcock & Wilcox's
Report to the Court Regarding Asbestos Developments Generally and the Proofs of
Claims Filed Here at 34, In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., Civ. No. 00-0558, Bankr. Case
No. 00-10992 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2001); see also infra text accompanying note 115,
whereas future asbestosis claims were to be compensated. According to the filing in the
Babcock & Wilcox bankruptcy, from 1993 to 1994, the number of asbestosis claims
received by Babcock & Wilcox rose from 15,353 to 21,844 and in 1995, increased to
31,399. Babcock & Wilcox's Report to the Court Regarding Asbestos Developments
Generally and the Proofs of Claims Filed Here at 34, In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., Civ.
No. 00-0558, Bankruptcy Case No. 00-10992 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2001). For the Manville
Trust, the number of (mostly unimpaired) asbestosis and pleural plaque claims increased
from 28,059 in 1999, to 53,094 in 2000 to 65,672 in 2001 (up through November 30,
2001). See Chart, Evaluated TDP Claim Filings, filed by the Manville Trust in response
to order of November 7, 2001 scheduling a hearing for December 13, 2001 to determine
whether "changed circumstances warrant ... modifications of "prior judgments regarding
use of medical audits. In re Asbestos Litigation, CV 91-875, CV 90-3973 (before J.
Weinstein and J. Lifland). "[C]laimants' counsel were [thus] reclassifying their clients'
unimpaired pleural claims as 'asbestosis' to defeat the Georgine exclusion for pleural
claims." Babcock & Wilcox's Report to the Court Regarding Asbestos Developments
Generally and the Proofs of Claims Filed Here at 34, In re Babcock & Wilcox Co., Civ.
No. 00-0558, Bankr. Case No. 00-10992 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2001).
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parties' use of their own experts, determined that of 65 plaintiffs claiming
to have contracted asbestosis-who, but for the court's order, would have
offered their own medical experts' testimony in support of their claims and
on that basis would very likely have been awarded significant
compensation by the jury-only 10 (15%) in fact had in fact contracted
asbestosis.' 13
Judge Rubin's finding is confirmed by the extensive experience of
the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust (the "Trust") which was
established as part of the Johns-Manville bankruptcy proceeding, as the
entity to provide compensation to tort claimants, using assets transferred to
it from Johns-Manville under the bankruptcy."14
113 See Carl B. Rubin & Laura Ringenbach, The Use of Court Experts in Asbestos
Litigation, 137 F.R.D. 35 (1991). "It became apparent [in asbestos cases] that the
plaintiffs had available a group of experts who always found asbestosis. They were
countered by a group of defendant experts who rarely if ever found asbestosis." Id. at 38.
To combat this "battle of the experts," Judge Rubin appointed medical experts for the
court in sixty-five (65) asbestos personal injury pending cases. Id. at 37. Judge Rubin's
use of court-appointed experts resulted in a drastic decline in the diagnosis of asbestosis.
Although plaintiffs experts undoubtedly would have testified that every single one of the
65 plaintiffs had asbestosis, the court-appointed experts found that 10 had asbestosis
(15.38%), 13 had pleural plaques (20%), and 42 were found to have no asbestos related
condition (64.62%). Id. at 45. In the September 1987-September 1990 period, the court-
appointed experts testified in 16 cases, in only two of the 16 did the jury find asbestosis
(12.5%). Id. at 39-40. The jury verdicts essentially followed the expert testimony. The
findings of the medical experts that Judge Rubin appointed contrast sharply with the
testimony of plaintiffs' medical experts and jury verdicts based upon that testimony.
Judge Rubin's data is consistent with what the Manville Personal Injury Trust
has determined with regard to claims of asbestosis filed against the Trust. Based upon
independent medical audits of x-ray's, the Trust concluded that 55-60% of asbestosis
claims are unsupportable by the medical evidence. Moreover, as a general rule, the more
recent the asbestosis claim, the more likely it is that it is unsupportable by the medical
evidence presented. See Letters from David T. Austern, General Counsel, Manville
Personal Injury Settlement Trust, to Lester Brickman (Mar. 5, 1998 and Apr. 30, 1998)
(on file with author).
114 In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken), 129 B.R. 710 (E. &
S.D.N.Y. 1991). The Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust Agreement (the "Trust
Agreement") provides at § 2.02 that the main purpose of the Trust is:
to use the assets of the Trust Estate to deliver fair, adequate and
equitable compensation to bona fide Beneficiaries, whether presently
known or unknown, without overpaying or underpaying any claims and
with settlement to be preferred over arbitration, arbitration to be
preferred over resort to the tort system, and fair and efficient resolution
of claims to be preferred over all else.
Affidavit of Patricia G. Houser 3, In re Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Trust Med.
Audit Procedures Litig., No. 98 Civ. 5693 (E. & S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999). Ms. Houser
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The Trust implements a schedule of "settlement values" for seven
categories of asbestos-related disease, ranging from pleural plaques to
asbestosis to malignancies, 15 and has the authority to require an x-ray
from all claimants" 6 and to audit all claim filings."17 In 1995, the Trust
instituted a medical audit program providing for a random audit of 5% of
each law finns' claims submitted per payment cycle." 8 The core of the
audit program was a process of review of claimants' x-rays by independent
medical experts.' 19 The review process was intentionally designed to
operate in favor of confirming the disease documented by the claimants. 120
is the President of the Claims Resolution Management Corporation, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the Trust, which provides claims resolution services to the Trust. Id. 1.
115 The seven categories are:
(I) bilateral pleural disease; (II) non-disabling bilateral interstitial lung
disease ("non-disabling asbestosis"); (III) disabling bilateral interstitial
lung disease ("disabling asbestosis"); (IV) other cancer; (V) lung cancer
(one); (VI) lung cancer (two); and (VII) malignant mesothelioma. Each
category of disease also calls for particular medical evidence to be
submitted in support of a claim, including, among other things,
documentation showing a diagnosis of disease on the basis of an x-ray,
CAT scan, or high resolution CAT scan.
Houser Affidavit 4. For a schedule of the values ascribed to each disease category, see
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust "Trust Distribution Process," at 8 (undated).
116 Houser Affidavit 5.
Id. 6.
118 Id. M 10-11.
119Homer Affidavit 13 states:
The hallmark of the 1995 program was a two-tiered review of
claimants' x-rays by independent B-readers. B-readers are physicians
who have received the highest possible certification in the use of the
International Labour Organization ("ILO") system of classifying x-rays
for the presence of asbestos-related and other lung conditions. All B-
readers are required to pass a rigorous National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH") proficiency examination.
We sought, received and acted upon suggestions from the plaintiffs' bar
with regard to acceptable B-readers .... Ultimately, the Trust retained
five B-readers to participate in the 1995 program, none of whom (to our
knowledge) had testified on behalf of an asbestos defendant.
120 Homer Affidavit 14-18 states:
Because the Trust is first and foremost a claims payment facility and
seeks to avoid dispute, we intentionally designed the x-ray review
process to operate in favor of confirming the disease documented by the
claimant and to give the benefit of any doubt to the claimant. We began
by providing for two independent B-readings. Even among certified
experts, not all physicians reading the same x-ray will make the same
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finding-this is known as "inter-reader variability." Especially in the
case of borderline asbestosis, there is significant inter-reader variability
among B-readers, including the independent B-readers who review
claims in the Trust's medical audit program. In order to offset the risk
associated with inter-reader variability, each claim subject to medical
audit was read by up to two B-readers. If the results of the first B-
reading supported the same or a higher disease category than was
documented by the claimant, the claim was released from audit and paid
according to the B-reader's findings (even at a higher disease category
than originally alleged by the claimant). If, however, the first B-reader's
findings instead showed no compensable disease or a lesser
compensable disease than documented by the claimant, the x-ray was
sent to a second independent B-reader. The second B-reader was not
aware of the results of the first review, or that he or she was the second
B-reader to review the film. Again, if the second B-reader's findings
supported the same or a higher disease category than was documented
by the claimant, the claim was released from medical audit, valued
consistently with those findings, and paid. But if the second B-reader's
findings also showed no compensable disease or a lesser compensable
disease than was asserted by the claimant, the claim would be re-
categorized based on the most serious disease findings of the two
independent B-readers. In other words, both B-readers had to disagree
with the claimant's physician's diagnosis for the claim to be
downgraded on the basis of their findings; if either B-reader agreed
with the diagnosis, the claim was released from audit and paid. In
addition, we told the independent B-readers to assume asbestos
exposure for each claimant. By virtue of the very fact that a claim had
been filed, the B-reader also knew that a doctor had already diagnosed
disease.
Another way we attempted to give claimants the benefit of the
doubt was to design the program to compensate even claimants who
could demonstrate only "sub-diagnostic" indicia of disease. Under the
standards of the American Thoracic Society there must be a minimal
"profusion" level (densities on the lungs that show up on x-ray film as
opacities) of 1/1 on the ILO Scale for an x-ray to be diagnostic of
asbestosis .... The ILO scale is a standard scale used by x-ray readers
to judge, among other things, opacities on the lungs ....
Despite this well-recognized "I/1" threshold for the diagnosis
of asbestosis, in the interest of settling claims, the Trust paid claimants
for whom a lesser profusion of "1/0" was supported. Only when even
that low-level, sub-diagnostic x-ray evidence of interstitial fibrosis was
not corroborated by either of two independent B-readers did the Trust
conclude that the claimant's submission was unreliable, and downgrade
the claim accordingly.
An additional way in which the medical audit program was
designed to operate in favor of claimants was to provide claimants with
a variety of remedies if their claims were downgraded as a result of
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Upon reviewing claims using the audit procedure, the Trust discovered
both a dramatic increase in the filing rates of asbestosis claims and a very
high medical audit failure rate for these claims.' 2' In light of this data, the
Trust:
had reason to believe, on a statistical basis alone, that a
portion of the asbestosis claims might not be based on
reliable medical evidence. At the same time, [the Trust]...
also observed that the nature of the claims being submitted
had fundamentally shifted-it became widely known that
the vast majority of new claims were being submitted
through mass litigation screenings. In addition, many
claimants appeared to have had lower or less direct
exposure to asbestos than had been seen in pre-1995 claims
filings and the documentation regarding both exposure and
medical evidence became extremely limited. 122
Against this background, the Trust became increasingly concerned
about the high volume of questionable asbestosis claims 123 and based upon
the results being obtained, placed some law firms on a 100% audit for the
medical audit. Claimants whose claims were downgraded following
medical audit could submit newer x-rays for this progressive disease or
other medical evidence and their claims would be re-evaluated by
another randomly selected B-reader (or B-readers) and, where
warranted, re-categorized. The Trust placed no limit on the number of
times an audited claimant could submit a new x-ray or medical report to
the Trust. Claimants could also choose to challenge the Trust's actions
through . . . arbitration and . . . request independent evaluation of
medical evidence by a member of a designated panel of experts ....
[S]hortly after implementation the program was modified to
provide for the admission of evidence of co-defendant settlements and
corroborating medical evidence in lieu of x-rays in appropriate
circumstances ....
121 Houser Affidavit 20. "[T]he Trust's medical audit program has resulted in a
significant number of claims being downgraded in severity." Quarterly Report of the
Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust at 4 (July 31, 1997). "Medical evidence of...
[asbestosis] has proven to be generally unreliable, and is confirned by independent B-
readers only approximately half the time." Quarterly Report of the Manville Personal
Injury Settlement Trust at 4 (July 31, 1998) (emphasis in original).
122 Houser Affidavit 20.
123 Id. 21.
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next payment cycle. 124 To that point, the plaintiff lawyers' representative
with an official role in the operation of the Trust had not seriously
questioned the Trust's authority to require x-rays from claimants or to
downgrade individual claims based on audit results. 125  However, in
response to the results of the audit program, the plaintiff lawyers'
representative pressed the Trust to re-design the audit program to focus on
attempting to identify fraudulent doctors instead of focusing on law firms
with high failure rates.1 26 The Trust's staff, after extensive examination of
various alternatives concluded that refocusing the medical audit program
on doctors or medical facilities would be impractical and inefficient.
27
124 Id. 22.
125 d. 23.
126 [d.
127 The reasons given were:
First, there are significant complexities in measuring the
doctor pass/fail data. Some claims include multiple medical reports
with diagnoses of varying severity, making it difficult to identify
accurately the physician primarily responsible for the diagnosis on
which basis the claim was categorized. Second, a given doctor's pass
rate varied considerably depending on the law firm submitting the
claim, suggesting that focusing on doctors alone would be unfair to
those claimants represented by law firms with better screening
processes or higher quality claim populations. Third, a doctor-based
audit meant that we would find ourselves in a perpetual search for the
next "Dr. Bogus." The reliability of claims reported by any doctor with
whom the Trust had not sufficient prior experience would be unknown
until a sufficient number of claims supported by that doctor had passed
medical audit. Fourth, once a doctor was found to be unreliable, all
claimants who had been diagnosed by that physician-even bona fide
claimants-would be forced to submit new medical reports. Thus, for
example, of the nearly 60,000 claims that became eligible for payment
in 1997, approximately 70% were diagnosed by doctors with less than a
60% pass rate. Under a doctor-based audit system all of those
claimants would be required to obtain new medical reports, which
would then be subject to further audit.
Due to the sheer number of claims being diagnosed by doctors
with low pass rates, plus the administrative burden of discriminating
among "good" doctors and "bad" doctors, confounded by the ongoing
need for additional perpetual audits, we again concluded that the most
efficient and equitable audit process was simply to require a chest x-ray
from every claimant alleging a non-malignancy claim . ... This
approach would remove the need for costly, time-consuming and
burdensome medical audit reporting and procedures and achieve the
highest level of certainty regarding the reliability of medical evidence
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Based upon the data that was being accumulated and the review of the x-
ray portion of the audit program by bio-statisticians at two major
universities, 28 the staff of the Trust recommended that the Trust
implement an audit program requiring x-ray review for all non-malignancy
claims (categories I-I). 12 9 The plaintiff lawyers' representative. objected
that the requirement was too burdensome.' 30 Ultimately, the Trust adopted
a less comprehensive new medical audit program in August 1998
providing for review of "x-rays for all Category II and Category Ed
asbestosis claims and would no longer accept corroborating medical
evidence or evidence of co-defendant settlements in lieu of x-rays for such
claims."' 131 The Trust's experience with the prior limited audit program
indicated a reduction of $925 per claim in 1995 and "concluded on that
basis that a 100% medical audit program would be beneficial to the Trust's
bonafide claimants."' 32
The Trust's medical audit program was challenged by nine law
firms in September 1998.133 The case was heard by U.S. District Court
Judge Jack Weinstein sitting without a jury in April 1999.134 From the
onset of the litigation, Judge Weinstein made known his view:
that the Trust had no business medically auditing claims
(regardless of any authority to do so in the Trust
documents) and that absent "manifest fraud" . . . the Trust
submitted to the Trust.
Houser Affidavit, 27-28.
128 Id. IM 29-30.
12 9 Id. 32; see also supra note 115.
130 Houser Affidavit 33-34.
131 Id. 38; see also Quarterly Report of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust
(Oct. 30, 1998); Memorandum titled Changes in Medical Audit/X-Ray Submission Policy
(Aug. 20, 1998).
132 Houser Affidavit 40. Because the Trust was paying out only a fraction of the
established settlement values of the claims presented, elinination of payment of
unsustainable claims would result in greater payments to bonafide claimants.
133 See Quarterly Report of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, at 2-3 (Oct.
30, 1998).
134 Judge Weinstein took over judicial supervision of the Trust, including the power to
appoint Trustees, after it became insolvent. Prior to the Trust's insolvency, it had paid
out $677,445,619 in claims, of which plaintiffs' counsels' fees totaled approximately
$250,000,000 despite the fact that claims were settled in groups of hundreds and
thousands. See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1835 n.61. For an
account of Judge Weinstein's role in mass tort litigation, see supra notes 60-62.
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was expected to pay every claim filed for the full amount of
the claim. . . . By the fifth day of the trial, the Trustees
decided to settle the matter and except for several doctors
that the plaintiffs' bar agreed filed x-ray reports of a
suspicious nature, the Trust was required to accept (absent
manifest fraud) all claims filed ... with respect to medical
evidence [and to discontinue its medical audit program
including its requirement that x-rays be submitted]. 15
Since the full impact of the settlement realized in fall 1999,
Manville Trust Claim Filings, on an annual basis, have almost doubled.136
135 See Letter from David T. Auster, President of the Claims Resolution Management
Corporation for the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, to the author (Oct. 3,
2001) [hereinafter Austem Letter] (original on file with author).
136 Id. Recently, Judge Weinstein has, on his own motion, decided to hold hearings on
whether to revisit a number of his prior rulings, stating:
The courts have received and reviewed the Financial
Statements and Report of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust
for the period ending September 30, 2001. The courts note that there is
a continuing rise in the number of claims and that the amount payed pro
rata on claims has been reduced from 10 percent to 5 percent of the
original value. The courts take judicial notice of the continuing media
and other campaigns encouraging a flood of new claims.
This combination of events, together with the increasing
number of bankruptcy filings by asbestos related entities, suggests that
there may be a misallocation of available funds, inequitably favoring
those who are less needy over those with pressing asbestos related
injuries.
Findley v. Trustees (In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litigation), 90 CV 3973 (JBW)
(E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2001).
In its response to the November 7, 2001 Order, the Trust recommended a change
in the Trust Distribution Process ("TDP") and provided additional data on the flood of
new claims on behalf of those with no asbestos-related physical impairment:
[T]he Trustees . . . recommended modifying the causation
criteria of the TDP . . . Currently, the criteria for each of the seven
Scheduled Disease Categories simply require that a proof of a claim
"identfy exposure to Manville asbestos products." We recommend
adding that to qualify for compensation a claimant generally must
identify industrial exposure to Manville asbestos products, meaning
direct exposure to asbestos products. when the products were
manufactured, applied, disturbed, or otherwise altered in a manner that
would normally produce asbestos dust. Where industrial exposure to
Manville asbestos products is absent there would be a rebuttable
presumption that the claimant has no asbestos-related disease.
While most trust claimants experienced industrial exposure to
2001]
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asbestos, during the past two years the Trust has been receiving large
volumes of claims filed on behalf of claimants exposed only to "in-site"
asbestos. Such claimants worked in factories or facilities where
asbestos insulated pipes or other asbestos products were located,
although the claimants were not present when the insulation was
installed, which is substantially more likely to lead to the inhalation of
asbestos fibers. Nonetheless, these claimants meet the current criteria
TDP scheduled diseases. Needless to say, given the ubiquitousness of
asbestos insulation and other products in American industrial sites
through much of the last century, the population of potential Trust
claimants would rise by tens of millions when non-industrial exposures
to asbestos are considered.
The flood of new claims reported in our quarterly reports to
the Courts and noted in the Courts' November 7, 2001 Order reflects an
unforeseen, disproportionate increase in claims filed on behalf of
claimants with no asbestos-related physical impairment whatsoever,
whose daily life is unaffected by their past asbestos exposure. Indeed, a
large share of the Trust's claimants now have "injuries" which are
imperceptible, even to themselves, without the aid of x-ray or other
imaging technology. These claimants are marshaled in mass screenings
that have as their primary purpose the rounding up of claimants whose
settlements will generate fees for the sponsors of the screenings. While
each unimpaired claimant generates smaller fees, screening sponsors
achieve desired aggregate fees through increased volume. Advances in
data processing have greatly reduced the difficulty and costs of
generating and tracking huge volumes of claim files. Together with the
large number of potential claimants, this ensures that the number of
unimpaired claims and the amount paid to them will continue to
increase so long as they remain compensable.
For instance, from TDP inception (February, 1995) through
November 30, 2001, the Trust has paid 76,268 Bilateral Pleural Disease
claimants (a growing number of state courts have held that
asymptonatic pleural disease is not a compensable disease) [citing to
Simmons v. Pacor, Inc. et al., 543 Pa. 664, 674-76; 674 A.2d 232, 237-
38 (Pa. 1996) (holding that asymptomatic pleural thickening is not a
compensable injury that gives rise to a cause of action, and citing court
decisions in other states which have held similarly)] ....
The flood of unimpaired claims can no longer be stopped
simply by reviewing the quality of the x-ray evidence supporting the
claims, as the Trust once tried to do, which in 1998, resulted in the
plaintiffs' bar suing the Trustees in Judge Weinstein's Court, which suit
terminated in a Court-approved settlement. There are millions of
workers still living who were occupationally exposed to asbestos. A
significant proportion of those workers genuinely exhibit x-ray changes,
which meet the current TDP categorization criteria for Scheduled
Diseases. In a report the Trustees reviewed just before concluding that
the pro rata payment share had to be lowered, it was estimated that if
LAWYERS' ETHicS AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
In assimilating and assessing the issue of the medical evidence
presented in asbestos litigation, it is useful to understand the financial
incentives that undergird the medical evidence producing business.' 37 X-
rays are usually read by specialized medical doctors called B-readers
138
who are paid for each x-ray. Since asbestos claiming is a high volume
business, payments are substantial. Moreover, as noted by the Manville
Trust, even as the quality of the medical evidence provided in support of
asbestos claims declined, there has "been an increasing trend toward the
use of a relatively small number of physicians."' 139 The influence of
lawyers who select the B-readers on the interpretation of the results is
pronounced. Different asbestos lawyers have different disease mixes
140
that characterize their portfolio of claims. To meet these objectives, B-
readers conform their outcomes to the preferences of the lawyers who hire
them.' 4 1 In light of this evidence, it may reasonably be presumed that a B-
reader who reports results incompatible with a law firm's preferences is
current claim filing trends under the TDP as it now stands continued,
the Trust could expect to receive as many as 2.5 million additional
claims (after 2000) ....
[A]s long as the Trust remains obligated to pay the ever-
increasing number of unimpaired claims it receives, it will be unable to
[properly] compensate its most deserving claimants ....
Letter from Robert A. Falise, Chairman and Managing Trustee of the Trust, to Judges
Jack B. Weinstein and Burton R. Lifland (Dec. 5, 2001); Findley v. Falise (In re Joint E.
& S. Dist. Asbestos Litig.) Case Nos. 82 B 11656 (BRL)-82 B 11676 (BRL), inclusive;
(E.D.N.Y.) 90 CV 3973 (JBW).
137For an account of that business, see supra note 111. For another account of a medical
practice set up to generate medical evidence in asbestos cases, see Brickman, Asbestos
Litigation, supra note 10, at 1878 n.249.
138 See supra note 119.
139 Quarterly Report of the Manville Personal Injury Settlement Trust at 4 (July 31,
1998).
140 For discussion of the disease mix in asbestos claiming, see Brickman, Asbestos
Litigation, supra note 10, at 1860-61.
141 See Affidavit of Patricia G. Houser 27, In re Manville Pers. Injury Settlement Trust
Med. Audit Procedures Litig., No. 98 Civ. 5693 (E. & S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) ("[A]
given doctor's pass rate [on the medical audit procedure] varied considerably depending
on the law firm submitting the claim ...."); Exhibit 24 at 3, Houser Affidavit ("A
doctor's pass rate can differ significantly by [law] firm."); Houser Affidavit at tbls. 2-4
(indicating the correlation between the x-ray readings by the same doctors as they differed
depending on the law firm that had hired them). Thus, one B-reader's results for law firm
A's clients might show a 95% pass rate in the audit procedure but that same B-reader may
have only a 50% pass rate when reading law firm B's chest x-rays submitted in support of
claims of asbestosis.
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likely to be an ex-B-reader.
So much for medical evidence and client testimony. Now let us
look at the trial of the case, keeping in mind that it is virtually certain that
the case will be settled-in part because of what happens at the relatively
few trials that do take place. Evidentiary rulings by courts make it
unnecessary for usual standards of causation to be satisfied.' 42  If the
142 See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1840-52; see also Ruffmg v.
Union Carbide Corp., N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (rejecting plaintiffs'
claims for damages for alleged toxic chemical poisonings at an IBM semiconductor plant
for failure to show that they had been exposed to a harmful level of the substances). That
decision is expected to set the ground rules for nearly 200 pending claims. See Michael
Riccardi, IBM Toxic Plaintiffs Face Strict Test, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 2001, at 1. The court
rejected plaintiffs' assertion that proof of the existence of the alleged harm, birth defects,
is sufficient to support the conclusion that there had been exposure to a harmful level of
the chemical, stating that "injury, no matter how horrible in dimension, cannot substitute
for evidence that another is responsible for its cause." Ruffing, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 2001,
at 41. The court stated:
As support for their contention that a more liberal approach is
taken in this State with respect to the exposure level issue, plaintiffs rely
upon several State and Federal court decisions in which plaintiffs
sought damages for injuries resulting from their exposure to asbestos or
asbestos-containing products. As relates to the State court litigation,
plaintiffs assert that "[t]he Appellate Division has repeatedly stressed
that a plaintiff need only show that the dangerous substance was present
at his work site in a form (i.e., out of its package or container), as in the
present case, that would render the plaintiff vulnerable to being
exposed." . . . Similarly, plaintiffs maintain that "the federal courts
applying New York law in toxic exposure cases have repeatedly held,
on proofs not even remotely as rigorous as those in the present case,
that plaintiffs' circumstantial exposure and causation proofs were fully
adequate to support plaintiffs' verdicts."
As plaintiffs correctly observe, in our State courts causes of
action for asbestos exposure have survived summary judgment motions
where the plaintiffs' proofs established that they "worked with asbestos
in confined, dusty areas" ..... or worked in a location where spraying
of an asbestos-containing product "was going on all the time" .. . .
Notably, the courts hearing these cases did not require greater proof of
exposure because, in each, "plaintiffs showed the facts and conditions
from which defendants' liability may be reasonably inferred"....
Addressing New York-based claims for asbestos exposure, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a similar approach to proof
of exposure levels ....
In view of the lack of a "signature" relationship between
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worker was at the site and there is testimony that the product was used at
the site and the worker claims a pleural plaque or other asbestos-related
condition, then the jury can draw the necessary inference and conclude that
the product caused the "injury.' ' 143 Moreover, for good measure, a demand
for punitive damages will be included, often successfully. 144
So why do I conclude that this branch of the Amchem 145 and
Ortiz146 decisions was wrongly decided? Consider the details of the
settlements. The lawyers' present inventory of claims were settled for
substantially inflated values. These included thousands and thousands of
exposure only claims. "Future" claims-that is, claims of those who may
at some point in the future present with injury, were also settled by setting
aside funds to pay those claims. As for the "future" exposure-only
claims, no moneys were set aside for them. They were valued at zero. 147
Instead of money, these "futures" were relieved of meeting any statute of
limitations burden so if they did present with an actual injury, they could
then seek compensation from the fund set up by the settlement.
The settling lawyers in Amchem and Ortiz received huge rewards,
fees totaling several hundred million dollars, in part, for purporting to sell
out the interests of future "exposure only" claimants by agreeing to a
procedure which valued those'claims at zero unless and until actual injury
was manifested. 148  That zero value is correct because the "futures"
Zachary's birth defects and the Causation Chemicals, there is no basis
for adopting the approach taken in asbestos exposure litigation, as
urged by plaintiffs.
Ruffing, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at 39-40 (citations omitted).
143See Brickman, Asbestos Litigation, supra note 10, at 1841 n.87. Aiding the jury in
this regard is the presentation of documentary evidence inculpating one defendant, which
is for the purpose of and has the effect of substantially increasing the verdicts against
other defendants even though the evidence in question does not pertain to them. See id. at
1845 n.ll0.
144 See id. at 1862-68 (stating the role of punitive damages in asbestos litigation cases
that are tried). About one percent of asbestos claims are tried. Findley v. Blinken (In re
Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig.) 129 B.R. 710, 747 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
145 Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), aff'g 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.
1996), decision below, 878 F. Supp. 716 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
146 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp, 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
147Indeed, the very basis for the settlement was the zero valuation for "futures" claims of
exposure-only claimants. The defendants' agreement to a global settlement was driven by
their desire to cap future claims and bring asbestos litigation to a foreseeable conclusion.
The only way that could be accomplished, short of a legislative solution, was to include
the provision eliminating future exposure-only claims.
148 See First Amended Complaint, G-I Holdings, Inc. v. Baron & Budd et al., 179 F.
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claimants have not suffered any injury and therefore ought not to be
entitled to any compensation. That truth, however is not the basis for my
conclusion that the settlements should not have been invalidated because
of a conflict of interest. The value of exposure-only claims in the tort
Supp. 2d 233 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (No. 01 Civ. 0216 (RWS)) (filed Apr. 30, 2001) for an
essentially first hand account of the Georgine settlement process:
In connection with the negotiation of the Georgine settlement, the CCR
[an association of 20 of the leading asbestos litigation defendants which
had banded together in joint defense of asbestos lawsuits, see, Queena
Sook Kim, Asbestos Claims Continue to Mount, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7,
2001, at B1] had entered into so-called futures agreements ("Futures
Agreements") with many of the nation's leading plaintiffs' asbestos law
firms ....
The Futures Agreements served as corollary to the Georgine
settlement by incorporat[ing] the Georgine medical criteria and
providing a mechanism by which any future filing of claims by "non-
sick" individuals would be deferred . . . . The Futures Agreements
provided that they would take effect if the Georgine settlement was not
ultimately upheld and further provided that, in that event, the CCR
would, as an alternative dispute mechanism, toll the running of the
statute of limitations for defendants' clients (and future clients) who did
not have any of the conditions set forth in the Georgine medical criteria
(and whose claims were not already time barred). The defendants
agreed, in turn, to recommend to their clients that they defer filing an
asbestos claim until they met the criteria ....
In entering into their Futures Agreements at the time of the
Georgine settlement, [plaintiff alleges that] defendants represented that
they believed that the Georgine medical criteria were "reasonable" and
that acceptance of the ADR procedure "will be in the interest of its
future clients who do not have a medical condition" defined by the
criteria in the Agreement "in that it offers such clients an alternative to
immediate litigation or settlement and release of their claims for
asbestos injury."
The typical Futures Agreement expressly states that the
subscribing firm will: recommend that its clients seriously consider this
alternative dispute resolution procedure. With respect to all clients who
accept this alternative dispute resolution procedure, [defendant law
firm] agrees to defer filing any asbestos-related personal injury claims
against CCR or any of its current members until such time if ever, as the
claimant develops one of the asbestos-related diseases described
[herein].
The consideration for the Futures Agreements included CCR's
agreement to settle some 50,000 pending asbestos cases for
approximately $750 million. That sum was paid to defendants by CCR
Id. IM 134-138.
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system is purely a function of the scheme that asbestos lawyers have
created and which I have previously described. Because the claims are
specious and only have value because of that scheme, the valuation is a
property right rightfully belonging to the lawyers who invested substantial
time, effort and money in creating those rights and not to their exposure-
only clients, who have suffered no injury, have no impaired lung function,
and are asymptomatic.
In a capitalist system, the rewards for the successful monetization
of these claims rightfully ought to belong to the lawyers. 149  Future
claimants who have no injury or impairment have no just cause for
complaint that their specious claims have been assigned a zero valuation.
When the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the settlements,
asbestos lawyers, of course, seized the opportunity to reestablish their fee
stream. Not only have the lawyers been able to keep the hundreds of
million dollars that they were paid as part of the settlements, they have
regarded the striking down of the settlements as freeing them to file claims
on behalf of the very future claimants for whom they had agreed to value
claims at zero, but shorn of that limitation. 15  Thus, these lawyers are
149 Cf Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938). A
similar argument has been to justify a million dollar fee in the "Adhesive Denture
Menace." "This national peril arose after a manufacturer recalled certain [dental]
adhesives containing traces of benzene, a potential carcinogen. Without evidence of any
actual injuries, vigilant attorneys brought suit on behalf of purchasers unaware of their
'victimhood.' The settlement gave several hundred known buyers $7 and some twenty-
eight hundred undocumented buyers the opportunity to fill out forms and receive a
package of discount coupons." DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 176 (2001). While the nearly million dollar fee may
seem like "a lot of money ... it cannot be easy, taking a case wherein it appears to the
naked unarmed layperson eye that nobody has suffered any observable harm, and using
legal skills, turning it into a financial transaction that involves thousands of people and a
million dollars! Plus coupons!" Id. (quoting Dave Barry, Lawyers Put the Bite on
Denture-Adhesive Maker, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 23, 1993, at 22.)
Lest anyone be misled by the merits of the arguments I have advanced, let me
state explicitly that I proffer them in the same vein as did Johnathan Swift in proposing to
prevent Irish children from being a burden by selling them as food for the table. See
JOHNATHAN SwIFT, A MODEST PROPOSAL (Charles Beaumont ed., C. E. Merril Pub. Co.
1969) (1729).
150 In June 1997, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Amchem rejecting the
Georgine settlement. By their express terms the Futures Agreements [see supra note 147]
were thereupon triggered and became binding upon the participants.
Nonetheless, despite the plain language of their Futures Agreements
and the hundreds of millions of dollars they received in connection with
them, defendants . . . [are not] recommend[ing] deferral of filing of
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building up new inventories of cases to sell off, consisting of those
exposure-only claimants who were formerly in the "futures" class, and
doing so at a more rapid rate than at any time during the course of the
asbestos litigation crisis.
15 1
C. Judicial Response to Aggregative Abuses
The abuses of aggregative litigation are compounded by recent
judicial decisions that grant attorneys full rein to run roughshod over client
interests. While individual clients have the right to seek redress from their
attorneys for breaches of the standard of care, self-interested behavior,
engaging in conflicts of interest, other breaches of fiduciary obligation,
and, in some cases, for breaches of lawyers' ethical obligations, in
aggregated actions involving large numbers of clients, particularly in class
actions where the lawyer conscripts the client, such client rights have been
largely eviscerated.152 Even lawyers who submerge their clients' interest
or who engage in self-dealing at their clients' expense are virtually
immune from the traditional disciplinary systems.' 53 This is so because
claims on behalf of non-sick clients . . : [and have] begun filing non-
sick claims at an even greater rate than they had filed them before the
Georgine settlement ....
First Amended Complaint, G-I Holdings (No. 01 Civ.0216 (RWS)) 139-40.
151 See id. Standard and Poor's has reported that insurers will set aside an additional 5 to
10 billion dollars in reserves in 2001 to cover asbestos-related claims because of the
significant increase in asbestos claims being filed. See Christopher Oster, Insurers to Set
Aside Additional Billions for Asbestos Claims, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 2001, at B1O.
Previously, insurers had paid out $21.6 billion in asbestos claims, and had already set
aside $10.3 billion for new claims. Id. Other analysts and ratings agencies recently have
estimated that the insurance industry will need to put up as much as $20 billion to $40
billion more to cover their asbestos exposure. Id. These amounts do not include the
considerable amounts spent by asbestos defendants which were not covered by insurance
and which has precipitated more than 30 bankruptcies. It is noteworthy that no reserve
established by any of the asbestos defendants or their insurers has ever proved sufficient.
See also Schmitt supra note 90.
152 "We agree with those who argue that lawyer abuse in class actions is rampant and that
the current system, far from keeping this abuse in check, is set up to shield lawyers from
the consequences of their misdeeds." Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak
of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1056 (1996).
153 See Wolfram, supra note 9, at 1233 (arguing that class action lawyers are beyond
reform, especially given the lack of policing methods and stating that "[w]hat is badly
broken, and what badly needs mending, is the basic class action and mass-litigation
system of litigation. The only effective way to rid the judicial system of Willie Suttons is
to take the profit out of robbing banks.").
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"[c]ourt approval of a settlement.. . insulates class counsel from collateral
attack by clients' aggrieved by an apparent sell-out of their claims by
lawyers laden with conflicts of interest."
'1 54
This is borne out by three recent cases. In Kamilewicz v. Bank of
Boston Corp.,15 5 plaintiffs Dexter and Gretchen Kamilewicz, mortgage
holders with BancBoston, were two out of 715,000 conscripted plaintiffs
in an Alabama state court class action, entitled Hoffman v. BancBoston
Mortgage Corp.,i5 6 involving the manner in which BancBoston calculated
the amount of escrow surplus that each mortgage holder had to maintain
(the "Hoffman action"). The claim in the Hoffman action was that
BancBoston overcharged mortgage holders, whose mortgages it serviced,
so that a very small surplus existed in the mortgage holders' escrow
accounts.
57
The plaintiff class in the Hoffman action was granted summary
judgment, and a notice of proposed settlement was sent to the plaintiff
class.158 The Alabama state court held a fairness hearing on the proposed
settlement and in January 1994, approved the settlement, which provided
that class members would be awarded amounts between $0.00 and
$8.76.159 The court also found the attorneys' fees requested reasonable,
and under the terms of the settlement, BancBoston would deduct the
attorneys' fees from the mortgage holders' escrow accounts.1 60  The
method of calculation of these fees was designed to defraud the members
154 Carrington & Apanovitch, supra note 11, at 469.
155 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied, 100 F.3d 1348, cert. denied, 520 U.S.
1204 (1997).
156 No. 91-1880 (Ala. Cir. Ct. Jan. 24, 1994).
157 There was no question that the excess moneys belonged to the mortgage holders.
Instead, the main issue in the case was "the propriety of BancBoston's holding the surplus
until the time it would be returned to the mortgagor." Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 508. It was
an issue of timing-at which point should these excess moneys be credited to the
mortgage holders' accounts. See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., No. 95-C6341,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18973 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1995).
158 See Kamilewicz, 1995 U.S. Dist. Lexis 18973, at *3. The defendants in the Hoffman
action objected to the proposed settlement on the basis that it did not disclose to the
plaintiff class that there were "'substantial adverse effects' to the proposed settlement,
including... [that] the plaintiff class would suffer an actual out-of-pocket loss as a result
of the lawsuit." Id. at *3-*4. According to the district court, this objection was withdrawn
as moot. See id. at *4 n. 1.
See Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 508.
160 See id. at 508-09.
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of the class.
16 1
As part of their recovery, the Kamilewiczes were awarded $2.19,
which was credited to their account, but their statement from BancBoston
161 Monthly mortgage bills are based on three components: principal, or the amount that
was borrowed; interest on that principal; and escrow, which is money for property taxes
and homeowners insurance that mortgage companies collect and then pay:
Because taxes and insurance fluctuate from year to year, banks
estimate those costs and divide those estimates into 12 equal portions to
smooth out monthly payments and prevent homeowners from getting
slammed a couple of times a year, such as when property taxes come
due. For decades, the industry used what's called the "itemized"
method to calculate escrow. One lawyer described it as "like having
separate little buckets" for each cost, then adding them together.
For various reasons, the itemized approach often
overestimated people's escrow requirements and created surpluses,
called cushions. The banks claimed that these cushions protected them
from paying bills that come due when homeowners defaulted. They
also argued that the itemized method was allowed by law, and noted
that virtually every lender in the country used that method.
No one was accusing the banks of stealing the cushions.
Annual statements sent to homeowners listed the balances, and the
banks returned the money in full when customers paid off their loans,
such as when they sold or refinanced their houses ....
Eddie Curran, You Win, You Pay, MOBILE REGISTER, Dec. 29, 1999, available at
http://www.al.com/news/mobile/Decl 999/5pt-4-2.html (last visited Dec. 1 2000).
[In the settlement] BancBoston had agreed to give lost-interest
credits to homeowners of no more than $8.76 apiece, and usually a
fraction of that. If the value of the settlement was the total of those
credits, a third of that amount probably would have resulted in a fee of
several hundred thousand dollars.
But the . . . [lawyers] contended that the settlement was worth
something else entirely: It was, they said, the total of the surplus that
would be returned early to the class. At the hearing, it was estimated
that BancBoston would reduce the $223 million then held in escrow by
19 percent, or by more than $42 million. [The lawyers] ... told [Judge]
Kittrell that the benefit to class members was equal to the size of that
reduction.
Eddie Curran, Bottom of the Class, MOBILE REGISTER, Dec. 30, 1999, available at
http://www.al.com/news/mobile/Decl 999/5pt-4-2.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2000).
The $8.5 million attorneys fees that was thus approved was based on a
percentage of the total amount held in the escrow accounts, not the much smaller benefit
actually received by the plaintiffs in the settlement, that is, the time value of the escrowed
surplus funds. The Hoffman action attorneys did not secure the escrow amount for the
plaintiff class because they would have received this amount at some point in the future.
The only recovery the attorneys got for their clients was that they had earlier access to
excess monies held in their escrow accounts.
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also indicated a miscellaneous disbursement of $91.33.'62 When they
discovered that this deduction was to cover the expense of the attorneys'
fees in the Hoffman action (the "Hoffman attorneys"), they and another
plaintiff (the "Kamilewicz plaintiffs") brought a class action against the
Hoffman attorneys in federal district court in Illinois.163
The Illinois federal district court (Plunkett, J.) granted the Hoffman
action attorneys' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
It held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 164 precluded it from reviewing a
decision of the Alabama state court because that would amount to a
collateral attack on a state court judgment in a federal court proceeding.
The doctrine recognizes the principle that the inferior federal courts do not
have the power to exercise appellate review on state court decisions.
165
The district court found that during the fairness hearing in Alabama, the
Hoffman action plaintiffs were in an adversarial position against their
162 See Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d. at 508. For an extensive analysis of the Kamilewicz facts,
see Koniak & Cohen, supra note 152, at 1056.
163 See Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d. at 509. The causes of action included: violations of the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 1962 (1994); violations
of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); common law fraud; negligent
misrepresentation; attorney malpractice; breach of fiduciary duty; and conversion.
Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d. at 509.
164The Rooker-Feldman doctrine was set out in Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
See, Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d. at 509. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine "bars federal suits
where, although the claims were not argued in the state court proceedings, they are
'inextricably intertwined' with the state court judgment." Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston
Corp., No. 95-C6341, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18973 (1995) (citing Wright v. Tackett, 39
F.3d. 155, 157 (7th Cir. 1994)). This doctrine "is a recognition of the principle that the
inferior federal courts generally do not have the power to exercise appellate review over
state court decisions." Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d at 509.
165 Kamilewicz, 92 F.3d. at 509. The district court found that during the fairness hearing
in Alabama, the Hoffman action plaintiffs were in an adversarial position against their
attorneys. Since the Hoffman action attorneys were asking the court to grant them their
fees, they were in the position of plaintiffs. The Hoffman action plaintiffs, on the other
hand, were in the position of defendants because they did not have to put up any evidence
on the issue of fees, but were allowed to object and cross-examine the Hoffman attorneys.
Therefore, when the Alabama state court rendered judgment on the settlement-by
providing its approval-all of the issues between the Hoffman action plaintiffs and their
attorneys had been already litigated. Thus, the district court found that in order to
adjudicate the Kamilewicz plaintiffs' claims, it would have to reexamine the papers filed
in the action below, and it was precluded from doing so under the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. The district court found that the only forum available to the Kamilewicz
plaintiffs was the Alabama state court system. Id.
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attorneys. Because the Hoffman action attorneys were asking the court to
grant them their fees, they were in the position of plaintiffs. The Hoffman
action plaintiffs, on the other hand, were in the position of defendants
because they did not have to put up any evidence on the issue of fees, but
were allowed to object and cross-examine the Hoffman attorneys.
Therefore when the Alabama state court rendered judgment on the
settlement-by providing its approval-all of the issues between the
Hoffman action plaintiffs and their attorneys had been already litigated.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision.' 66 It later denied rehearing of the motion en banc, but there was
a strong dissent written by Judge Easterbrook who disagreed that the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine was applicable to the Kamilewicz action. 16 7
Judge Easterbrook went on to say that this action was not a
collateral attack on the Hoffman action. Instead, this was a malpractice
action, and since there is no requirement that a malpractice action be filed
with the court that rendered the underlying judgment, the Rooker-Feldman
166 Id. The court held:
The Kamilewiczes were class member/plaintiffs in the Alabama suit.
The part of the judgment they are unhappy with is the approval of the
settlement as to the fees to be paid to their attorneys-fees that were
assessed against them. The district court concluded that the Kamilewicz
plaintiffs were in the position of defendants in this aspect of the state
court proceedings. That conclusion has some support in logic and
bolsters a finding of a Rooker-Feldman bar. More important, however,
is the fact that the plaintiffs' injuries are a result of the state court
judgment. Their claim in federal court is a multi-pronged attack on the
approval of the settlement regarding the attorney fees issue. Regardless
of which of the specific federal claims that district court were to
consider, it would run directly into the state court finding, entered after
a two-day fairness hearing-that the fees were reasonable. The federal
claims are "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment,
whether that judgment is right or wrong.
Id. at 511.
167 See Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp, 100 F. 3d. 1348 (7th Cir. 1996)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). In his view, the Kamilewicz plaintiffs were seeking to
collaterally attack the Alabama state court judgment based on lack of jurisdiction. If a
court renders a decision without subject matter or personal jurisdictions, no court can give
full faith and credit to that judgment. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797
(1985). If the Alabama state court did not have jurisdiction over the Kamilewicz
plaintiffs, as they argued, then there would be no reason why an action could not be
brought in federal court to attack such a judgment. Therefore the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine should not be an obstacle for the Kamilewicz plaintiffs to obtain review.
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doctrine was again inapplicable. 168 Judge Easterbrook further stated that if
a malpractice action could only be brought in the same court, then that
would have the effect of eliminating all malpractice actions in federal
court, even if the requirements of diversity jurisdiction were met.169 Judge
Easterbrook highlighted that the difference with malpractice actions is that
"it is a suit against a nonparty (the lawyer) alleging harm from
incompetent or deceitful acts. That the lawyer's misconduct occurred in a
judicial proceeding doesn't insulate the lawyer from liability, even when
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine insulates the judgment."'' 70
Furthermore, he stated that the Kamilewicz plaintiffs could not
have petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari because their claims are
outside the scope of § 1257:171
[T]hey did not discover the malpractice until later (it was
not reflected in the record of the state proceeding); it was
not litigated in the Hoffman case; class members can't seek
appellate review without intervening, which further
illustrates their non-party status; and of course malpractice
is not a federal claim ....
Judge Easterbrook was most troubled by the idea that if the panel's
decision was adopted by other courts, there would be an end to malpractice
litigation in any court. 173 He reiterated that a malpractice action is separate
from the underlying action:
168 Kamilewicz, 100 F.3d. at 1351.
169 See id.
170 Id.
171 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994).
172See Kamilewicz, 100 F.3d. at 1352. Moreover, Judge Easterbrook noted that the only
way that the Kamilewicz plaintiffs could have been parties to the Hoffman action was if
their interest was adequately represented by the named plaintiffs and that they had
received adequate notice and opportunity to opt out of the class. Since the Kamilewicz
plaintiffs were attempting to show that they had not been adequately brought into the
action, Judge Easterbrook wrote that not enabling these plaintiffs to bring this claim "gets
the cart before the horse." Id. He further rejected the notion that a fairness hearing
provided the plaintiffs with a full and fair litigation. Id.
173 See id. at 1353. "If the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to suits by the absent class
members because a malpractice action is a collateral attack on the order approving the
settlement and awarding attorneys' fees, then the law of preclusion (res judicata) should
bar malpractice actions in any court, state or federal, and without regard to which judicial
system handled the first case." Id.
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A (potential) defense of issue preclusion is defeated by the
very theory of the claim: that the first judgment is
unreliable because of the attorney's bungling. The bungler
cannot point to the adverse judgment produced by his own
incompetence to ward off the client's demand. The
Kamilewicz class may fail in its proof, or it may encounter
other obstacles, but the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not
close the door to the federal courthouse. 174
Because the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, 175 the
Kamilewicz plaintiffs are now foreclosed from receiving any redress
against the Hoffman action attorneys. Basically under the federal courts'
holding, lawyers are immunized by a fairness hearing from a malpractice
action by their clients no matter how egregious their conduct.
In Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 176 the Ninth Circuit reversed the decision
of a three judge panel and essentially agreed with the Seventh Circuit in a
decision effectively concluding that clients' rights vis-a-vis, their class
lawyers are essentially terminated by a so-called "fairness" hearing. Judge
Sporkin, in Thomas v. Albright,177 barred a malpractice action brought by
class members against class counsel, effectively holding that the adequacy
of class counsel's representations was fully adjudicated at the fairness
hearing. 17
8
Id.
175Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 520 U.S. 1204 (1997).
176 179 F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).
17777 F. Supp. 2d 114 (D.D.C. 1999).
178 Id. at 121. Judge Sporkin based much of his ruling on what he believed the
consequences were of allowing such malpractice actions to go forward. He wrote that
the threat of such actions "could discourage future class counsel from attempting to settle
and compromise a class action . . . [i]n actions where a class seeks prospective and
retroactive injunctive relief, such handcuffing would sound a death knell to class
counsel's ability to evaluate its case and negotiate a workable settlement in the best
interest of the class as a whole, in a timely manner." Id. at 122. In referring to actions by
lawyers in the Lincoln Savings and Loan matter that facilitated the commission of fraud,
Judge Sporkin asked: "Where were [the lawyers] . . . when these clearly improper
transactions were being consummated? Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate
themselves from the transactions?" Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v. Wall, 743 F. Supp.
901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990). One answer of course is that more than eighty law firms were
busily collecting an estimated $70 million for representing the parent company of Lincoln
Savings in its five years of dealing with the Federal Bank Board. RHODE, supra note 149,
at 109. Applying Judge Sporkin's cri de coeur to the class action context leads to a
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Two other decisions, 179 however, have allowed plaintiffs to
successfully sue their attorneys for breach of fiduciary duty. Arce v.
Burrows,180 a Texas state court action, held that attorneys entering into an
aggregated settlement on behalf of their clients without obtaining their
clients' consent breached their fiduciary duty. As a consequence, the
attorneys had to forfeit a portion of their fees. In Arce, multiple plaintiffs
hired attorneys, the defendants, to represent them individually in a
personal injury case stemming from an explosion at a chemical plant.
1 81
They agreed to payment on a contingency fee basis. After their attorneys
entered into an aggregate settlement without obtaining their consent,' 8 2 the
plaintiffs initiated a state court action. The court held that a fiduciary
relationship imposes a "duty... of loyalty and good faith, strict integrity,
and fair and honest dealing."' 83 Because a fiduciary relationship exists
between an attorney and his client as a matter of law, the court held that
fee forfeiture is a viable remedy when the attorney breaches his fiduciary
duty to his client.1 84 The client only needs to prove that a breach occurred,
not actual damages in order to be entitled to fee forfeiture.
185
Although Arce was not a class action, it did allow multiple
plaintiffs who felt that they had been wronged (by their attorneys not
seeking their informed consent to an aggregated settlement) to sue for
similar question to be posed: Where were the judges?
179In a third case, Zimmer Paper Products, Inc. v. Berger & Montague P.C., 758 F.2d 86
(3d Cir. 1985), the court inferred that class members may sue class counsel for breach of
fiduciary obligation.
180 958 S.W.2d. 239 (Tex. App. 1997). For a discussion of Arce, see Errin Martin,
Comment, The Line Has Been Drawn On The Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Implications of Burrow v. Arce on Texas Practitioners, 32 TEX. TECH L. REv. 391
(2001).
181 See Arce, 958 S.W.2d. at 243.
182 This was a violation of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct 1.08(0.
Id. at 245 n.4.
183 Id. at 246.
184 Id.
185 See id. at 248. The court held that the amount of the forfeiture should be determined
on a case-by-case basis because the attorney may have provided valuable services to the
client prior to the breach, for which the attorney should be compensated. Id. at 250. The
court looked to the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers for factors that
would be considered in making the determination of the amount of fee forfeiture. Those
factors include: "(1) the extent of the attorneys' misconduct; (2) the willfulness of the
attorney's misconduct; (3) any threatened or actual harm to the client; and (4) the
adequacy of other available remedies." Arce, 958 S.W.2d at 250 (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 cmt. D (Proposed Final No. 1 1996)).
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breach of fiduciary duty even though they had agreed to a settlement.
The Ninth Circuit similarly allowed a cause of action for
malpractice by former clients against their attorneys who had settled a
shareholder derivative action by court order in the case of Durkin v. Shea
& Gould.186 In that case, the plaintiffs argued that their former attorneys
had breached their fiduciary duty with regard to the manner in which the
settlement of the shareholder derivative suit was structured and had
committed malpractice. To prove malpractice, plaintiffs had to prove
common law negligence: duty, breach, causation and damage. The
defendants asserted that issue preclusion prevented the litigation of
malpractice because there had already been a full and fair litigation on the
issue, as well as a final judgment on the merits. 187 The court held that
plaintiffs had not had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the alleged
malpractice because the malpractice action did not accrue until after the
settlement became final.18 8 The court, therefore, held that the plaintiffs'
attorneys should not be immunized from a subsequent malpractice action
simply because a court had approved a settlement or entered a judgment.
"To hold otherwise would be to rule that where an attorney's negligence
has caused a court to make an erroneous adjudication of an issue, the fact
that the court has made that adjudication absolves the attorney of all
accountability and responsibility for his negligence."'189
The Arce and Durkin cases notwithstanding, the mass tort system
has stripped the ability of the two core lawyer regulatory systems
(disciplinary board enforcement of ethics codes and civil actions for
breach of the standards of care and of conduct) to monitor attorneys.
Courts have essentially joined together with plaintiff lawyers to overthrow
fundamental client protections that have evolved over the past 600 years.
Denying clients who have literally had their pockets picked by their
lawyers the right, for example, to seek redress by invoking the same tort
system that their ostensible lawyers are invoking to generate multi-million
dollar fees for themselves may be seen to be a reflection of the immense
power that aggregative attorneys have come to wield in our society.190
This power is, at base, a consequence of the enormous amounts of
186 92 F.3d 1510 (9th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 520 U.S. 1197 (1997). Whether Durkin is
still good law in the Ninth Circuit is an open question in view of Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179
F.3d 641 (9th Cir. 1999).18 7 Durkin, 92 F.3d. at 1515.
18 8 See id. at 1517.
189 Id. at 1518 (quoting Ruffalo v. Patterson, 285 Cal. Rptr. 647, 648 (1991)).
190 See supra note 13.
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fee income that aggregative litigation is generating. Stated simply, courts
are awarding fees in many of these cases, which routinely and vastly
overcompensate lawyers. Judges justify the fees awarded by noting that
attorneys must be provided with sufficient compensation to yield the
necessary incentives to undertake the litigation to effectuate client rights in
an era when legislatures are stymied by special interests and administrative
agencies are shackled by budgetary constraints. Even if that proposition
were accepted at face value, however, it cannot justify the enormous
fees-the tens and hundreds of million of dollars-being awarded.
One of the more pernicious fee setting devices that courts have
permitted is the basing of the class action fee as a percentage of an
artificial settlement value when the reality is that the actual payments to
the class will be a fraction of the announced settlement value. Thus, in the
reversionary settlement (as opposed to the pro-rata), where any funds
unclaimed by the class revert to the defendant, the lawyers' fee can easily
amount to 200% or more of the amount actually paid to class members. 191
As a reaction against some of the excesses of the class action
191 See Motion For Leave To File Amici Curiae and Brief Amici Curiae in Support of
Petition, Int'l Precious Metals Corp. v. Waters, 530 U.S. 1223 (2000) (in support of
petition for certiorari, June 5, 2000). This was likely the case in Waters where there was
a forty million dollar reversionary fund settlement which provided that any amount of the
fund not claimed by class members and not paid out as attorney's fees and expenses was
to return to defendants. This agreement resulted in awarding class counsel, $13,333,333
(one-third of the reversionary fund), whereas the distribution to the class plaintiffs only
amounted to $6,485,362.15. In other words, the fee award allowed by the District Court
was more than twice the amount of the class' recovery. Int'l Precious Metals, 530 U.S.
1223 (2000). Although the Court dismissed the petition for certiorari seeking to
challenge the fee award, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed a concurrence explaining her
reason for denying the petition for a writ of certiorari. Justice O'Connor agreed that as a
result of utilizing the reversionary settlement method, the award of attorney's fees were
"extraordinary." Id. at 1223. She also recognized that these settlements "potentially
undermine the underlying purposes of class actions by providing defendants with a
powerful means to enticing class counsel to settle lawsuits in a manner detrimental to the
class [and] . . . encourage the filing of needless lawsuits." Id. However, Justice
O'Connor asserted that rehearing of this case did not provide a fitting opportunity to
redress this injustice because of the existence of a "clear sailing" agreement, which
provided that the petitioners would not, "directly or indirectly oppose [respondents']
application for fees." Id. Indeed, "as a result of... [these 'clear sailing' agreements],
courts often lack the information necessary to protect the interests of the class against the
conflicts inherent in the settlement process." Brief of Amici Curiae, id. at 9-10, Waters.
Justice O'Connor's shot-across-the bow, however, lands far short of doing damage to
abusive reversionary settlements. So long as class counsel insist on "clear sailing"
provisions, there may never be an opportunity, per Justice O'Connor's condition, for the
court to eliminate this clear abuse.
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system, some courts which had shifted fee setting from the lodestar to the
percentage method have began to refocus on the lodestar. However, use of
the lodestar instead of the percentage method for fee setting does not
eliminate overcompensation. Indeed, the unspoken truth about the
lodestar is that it is often laden with uncountable numbers of hours, which
are counted even though they lack accountability. 192 If law firms were
audited to determine how many hours each lawyer in the firm was
claiming in all of the class action cases they were participating in, I have
no doubt that for some and probably for many, their fees would be out of
this world-literally. Instead of a day being merely 24 hours long as it is
on Earth, for many of these lawyers, the number of hours in a day would
more closely correspond with that of some of the outer planets, Saturn for
example. 1
93
11. CONCLUSION
A principal consequence of overcompensation is the proliferation
of much aggregative litigation, and, in particular, class action activity,
192 See Note, Developments in the Law- The Path of Civil Litigation, 113 HARv. L. REv.
1827 (2000) (stating "class counsel may inflate their hours, overstate the risks of litigation
or otherwise exaggerate the compensation they deserve"). Because a fee dispute arose
between the Chicago lawyers and the Alabama lawyers who were the plaintiff lawyers in
Kamilewicz, that case provides a modest insight into hourly record keeping procedures in
class actions. The lawyers had agreed to split their fees 60-40. The Chicago lawyers
believed they had been short-changed and sought an accounting from the Alabama
lawyers who had actually collected the fee. The latter refused but did send a copy of IRS
Form 1099 provided by BancBoston showing a total fee payment of $7.18 million. When
the Chicago lawyers went to BancBoston, they learned that the bank had actually paid
$8,556,201. Litigation thereafter ensued with regard to the fee split. During the fee fight,
both sides testified to the amount of time they had worked on the case. The Alabama
lawyers filed a brief citing testimony by one of the Chicago lawyers that he had worked
130 hours on the case and the other Chicago lawyer, less than that. The Alabama firm
stated that it worked about 2000 hours on the case and the Chicago lawyers worked, at
most, 335 hours. Together these figures totaled 2,335 hours. See Curran, You Win, You
Pay, supra note 161. At the hearing several years earlier to determine the fairness of the
settlement and approve the fee, the lead Alabama lawyer testified that he and two other
members of his firm performed about 60% of the work on the case-between 5,500 and
7,500 hours. He further testified that the Chicago lawyers did the other 40% and that
their total hours on the case came to around 10,000-more than four times the number of
hours claimed in the testimony presented in the later fee dispute law suit. Id.
193 A Saturn day, for example, is 244.8 Earth hours. See CALIF. INST. OF TECH.,
WELCOME TO THE PLANETS, available at http://pds.jpl.nasa.gov/planets/special/saturn.htm
(last visited Dec. 1, 2001).
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without any redeeming social value. It is simply fee driven.194 The process
may be seen as perverse in that the aggregative strategies that courts have
devised to deal with the effects of mass tort claims on courts' dockets
facilitate the bringing of more mass tort claims, requiring, in turn,
additional aggregative responses.
Perhaps the most important article on the subject of aggregative
litigation not yet written-at least in part because of the difficulty
involved-is one about the aggregate social effect of aggregative
litigation-for example, an analysis of the costs of aggregative litigation
including class actions and who pays for them as well as of the benefits,
and who receives them. The huge increase we have witnessed in
aggregative litigation in the past decades as well as the enormous wealth
transfers that have resulted are typically justified by the deterrence effect
of such litigation on malevolent corporate behavior. This conclusion,
however, is as least as much an article of faith as a matter of empirical
reality. Just as it has become increasing clear that, on the whole, punitive
damages have little deterrence effect' 95 and indeed appear to inhibit
improvements in product safety, so too, empirical and analytic attention to
aggregative litigation may reveal a similar dysfunctionality.
194To be sure, most all class action litigation is fee driven. My focus is on class action
litigation where the assertion of wrongful conduct is pretextual or the alleged injury
nonexistent and the use of the class action vehicle is simply' a means of extracting a
wealth transfer in order to generate fees. I
195 See generally W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against
Corporations on Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998); W. Kip
Viscusi, Why There is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381 (1998); W. Kip
Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313
(2001). For an argument that personal injury law does not have much deterrence effect,
see Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 558, 559-90
(1985); Stephen D. Sugarman, A Century of Change in Personal Injury Law, 88 CALIF. L.
REv. 2403, 2431-31 (2000).
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APPENDIX
AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 1966 AMENDMENT TO
RULE 23 OF THE CIVIL RULES OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE1
As class actions have proliferated and the amounts of wealth
transferred under the aegis of amended Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
have grown exponentially, it is instructive to consider the effect of the 1966
amendments to Rule 23, and whether those effects were intended
consequences of the amendments, and, if not, whether changes to Rule 23 are
appropriate. The logical beginning point is an examination of the purposes
of the 1966 amendments and some of the actual effects of those changes.
The former Rule 23 provided for three categories of class actions
defined in terms of "jural relations:" the "true" class action, in which the
rights were "joint, or common, or secondary;" the "hybrid" class action, in
which rights were "several" and affecting "specific property;" and the
"spurious" class action, in which rights to be enforced were "several" with
"common questions of law or fact" and "common relief.' 2 Judgments in the
"true" and "hybrid" class actions extended to the class, while the judgment
in a "spurious" class action extended only to the parties that intervened.3
The Advisory Committee's objectives in amending Rule 23 were:
(1) to redefine the cases that could proceed under rule 23, by
adopting more functional definitions of class actions, (2) to
clarify the effect of a class action judgment on members of the
class, (3) to codify some of the better class action practices
that federal judges had developed, (4) to provide district court
judges more guidance regarding their procedural powers and
responsibilities, and (5) to deal explicitly with the notice that
should be provided to absent class members. 4
My research assistant, Allan Blutstein, has provided invaluable assistance in the preparation
of this Appendix.
2 Norman C. Sabbey, Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REv. 539 (1969).
3Id.
4Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the
"Class Action Problem," 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 669 (1979); See also Proposed
Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, 39 F.R.D.
310 [Vol.26:243
LAwYRS' ETIcs AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATION
In drafting current Rule 23(b)(3), the Advisory Committee changed
the "opt-in" procedure of "spurious" class actions to an "opt-out" procedure
whereby absentee class members became bound by the judgment unless they
"opted out" before trial.5 This "opt-out" mechanism is described in Rule
23(c)(2). Under Rule 23(c)(2), members of a (b)(3) type class action receive
"the best notice practicable under the circumstances," advising each member
that the court "will exclude the member from the class if the member so
requests." 6 Under Rule 23(c)(3), members of a (b)(3) class action who do
not opt out are bound by the judgment "whether or not favorable to the
class.",7 The intent of the Committee in making this revision is not clear.
Most of the Committee's work product, notes, and correspondences have not
been published and are accessible only by visiting the federal archives in
Maryland, where the material is stored in boxes.8 Therefore, "[t]he paucity
of source material and research makes any inference about Committee intent
somewhat hazardous and necessarily tentative."9 The Advisory Committee's
Notes in subdivision (c)(3) suggest that one possible reason for the change
was to eliminate the "so-called 'one-way' intervention in 'spurious' [class]
actions." 1
0
Intervention by class members in the former spurious class actions
was optional. If the class member did not intervene before trial of the
liability issue, his claim was not precluded by the plaintiffs loss. Some
courts, however, would allow the class member to intervene after the trial on
73, 98-107 (1966); DAVID LOUISELL & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., PLEADING AND
PROCEDURE 833 (2d ed. 1968):
The 1966 revision undertook three tasks: First, it sought to eliminate the
confusing classification system of original Rule 23. Second, it sought to
make absolutely clear the availability of a class suit in cases where joinder
of a large number of people was indicated under the necessary principles
of Rule 19. Third, it provided encouragement and machinery for new uses
of the class suit.
Id. (citations omitted).
5See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), (c)(2), (c)(3).
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A).
7FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3).
8 Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation," LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991,
at 9 n. 17. Resnik suggests that the material in the federal archives "may well be incomplete"
since she was unable to locate all off the references contained in the files. Id.
9Robert Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms.- Reconceiving the History of
Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 292 (1990) (reviewing STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987)).
10 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), advisory committee's notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966).
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the liability issue if the plaintiff won, and to take advantage of the victory-
so-called "one-way intervention."11 The rationale of one-way intervention
was to assist small claimants who could not obtain relief because they could
not afford to intervene.
1 2
As to the propriety of the one-way intervention, the Advisory
Committee did not state explicitly in its Notes that it thought this type of
intervention was unfair; it merely cited to cases representing conflicting
views, and commented that the proposed rule excluded one-way
intervention.13  Benjamin Kaplan, who was the Reporter to the Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules at the time Rule 23 was amended in 1966, was
"similarly cryptic" in discussing the Committee's reasoning for rejecting one-
way intervention,' 4 stating only that critics found the procedure "distasteful,"
"as lacking 'mutuality,"' and a "perverse anomaly" in that the class action
"did not run fully for or against the class."' 5 Nevertheless, the very fact that
subdivision (c)(2) eliminates one-way intervention, combined with the
Committee's lengthy discussion of the issue, indicate a high likelihood that
the Committee drafted subdivision (c)(3) with the specific intention of
eliminating one-way intervention.' 6 There is no discussion, however, of
whether the Committee sought to or realized that it could eliminate one-way
intervention without making the profound changes that it did make in Rule
I317
11 The leading case allowing one-way intervention was Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v.
Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1961). For further cases dealing with one-way intervention,
see FED. R CIV. P. 23(c)(3) advisory committee's notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966). It should
be noted that only a minority of courts permitted one-way intervention in the 1960s. See
John E. Kennedy, Class Actions: The Right To Opt Out, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 3, 16 n.78 (1983).
12 See Sabbey, supra app. note 2, at 546.
13 See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(3), advisory committee's notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 105 (1966); see
also Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1318, 1395 (1976) (stating
"the reasons the rulemakers opposed the one-way intervention are not clear").
14 Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra app. note 13, at 1395.
15 Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 385-86 (1967).
16 See Kennedy, supra app. note 11, at 16-17 (stating that "the Rule reformers, paying heed
to criticism of Union Carbide and 'one-way intervention,"' came up with a "brilliant new
solution" to the debate over the binding effect of judgments on class members);
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, supra app. note 13, at 1394 ("One of the central
purposes of the draftsmen was the elimination of one-way intervention.").
See Note, Multiparty Litigation: Proposed Changes in the Federal Rules, 50 IOWA L.
REv. 1135, 1163-64 n.158 (1965) ("If the advisory committee was most worried about the
possibilities of 'one-way intervention' it could have proposed a rule prohibiting such in
express terms, rather than including a section specifically stating the effect of the
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An additional reason for the change from "opt-in" to "opt-out" may
have been to assist small claimants who, in the view of the drafters, would
not act in their best interests by opting in prior to trial.18 Accordingly, the
drafters changed the consequences of non-action by small claimants by
providing that non-action would automatically include them in the class
action. Consider in this context the remarks of Benjamin Kaplan:
If, now, we consider the class, rather than the party opposed,
we see that requiring the individuals affirmatively to request
inclusion in the lawsuit would result in freezing out the claims
of people-especially small claims held by small people-who
for one reason or another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity
with business or legal matters, will simply, not take the
affirmative step. The moral justification for treating such
people as null quantities is questionable. For them the class
action serves as something like the function of an
administrative proceeding where scattered individual interests
are represented by the Government. In the circumstances
delineated in subdivision (b)(3), it seems fair for the silent to
be considered as part of the class.' 9
judgment.").
18 See, e.g., Tom Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 501, 507 (1969) ("[T]he 'smaller guy' normally is not involved with
lawyers and legal proceedings. Not many of such persons would take affirmative action to
intervene in a spurious action under the former Rule." The article also asserts that
subsection (c)(2) "is probably the most dramatic indication that the chief purpose of the
amended Rule is to aid the small claimant.").
19 Kaplan, supra app. note 15, at 397-98. Kaplan specifically noted, however, that his views
are "entirely personal and have no other status." Id. at 356 n.*. Judge Frankel described a
phone call he made to Kaplan to ask about the background to Rule 23(c)(2):
Departing from sound practice, I made an ex parte call to Prof. Ben
Kaplan of Harvard, who, as you know, was the Reporter of the new Rules,
and who in a sense may be the missing Hamlet of this performance to
show cause why he did what he did about this notice thing. Ben came
graciously off the beach at Martha's Vineyard to take my call, and I should
say that I have some doubts about whether a man who is, caught in his
shorts that way, without his notes, should be held firmly to everything he
says. Nevertheless, with this private reservation, I did put him the
question about this sub-section. He blushed and stammered a little bit-
which is his way, as all of you who know him know-and then recalled
that his committee had indeed thought at some length about how this
notice should work. The reasoning, as he told it to me, relates to the
fundamental conception that I have already touched of classes comprised
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It is important to note, however, that the Advisory Committee's Notes
to Rule 23(c)(2) and (c)(3) discussed only the elimination of one-way
intervention as a possible basis for the opt-out mechanism, and did not
mention as a rationale that small claimants were not opting in insufficient
numbers to satisfy the drafters' political beliefs regarding the use of litigation
to police corporate behavior. Additionally, the Committee did not indicate
whether it had contemplated that class actions ought to be brought when all
the class members had claims for just a few dollars and where there were
thousands or hundreds of thousands of class members, and therefore the "opt-
out" mechanism should be instituted to facilitate such actions.20 Some
commentators answered this question in the negative, including one plaintiff
antitrust lawyer who stated:
[I]t is sheer nonsense to say that the purpose of Rule 23 is or
should be to secure redress to individuals whose damage is,
on an individualized basis, minuscule. I do not believe that
the efficient administration ofjustice is served by clogging the
Courts with class action claims for the purpose of insuring
that the so-called "Two-Dollar Bettor" gets his money back
from a price-fixing conspiracy or a 1 0(b)(5) violation. That
may well be the effect of the Rule's utilization, but I do not
see myself on a white horse dressed in armor, lance extended
doing battle with the dragons to recover $6.59 for Mrs.
Housewife. 2'
of little people, who normally don't have much dealing with lawyers or
with legal formalities. He got to speaking quite professorially-and I
wrote down what he said--of the class action's "historic mission of taking
care of the smaller guy." As he and the committee saw it, the likelihood
is that this guy will routinely ignore, or at least fail to respond to, the
notices contemplated under (c)(2). On that premise, the vote went the way
we see, to the effect that a non-response means inclusion rather than
exclusion.
Marvin Frankel, Amended Rule 23 From a Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295,
299 (1966).
20 Jonathan M. Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class
Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 842, 847 (1974)
(describing the Committee's intent as "shrouded in mystery").
21 Maxwell M. Bleicher, Is the Class Action Rule Doing the Job? (Plaintif's Viewpoint), 55
F.R.D. 365, 369 (1972); see also Landers, supra note app. 20, at 848 (concluding from the
lack of Congressional support in 1970 for legislation authorizing some consumer class
actions that "[i]f rule 23 may be interpreted to permit consumer class actions by those whose
claims are small and whose numbers are great, this development is nothing short of
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The changes in subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(2) were not expected to
have a profound effect on the litigation landscape. Arthur Miller contends
that "in the main, the rulemakers apparently believed that they simply were
making Rule 23 a more effective procedural tool" and that the "class action
onslaught caught everyone, including the draftsmen by surprise.' 22 Only
some predicted the consequential expansion in class action litigation.23 The
Advisory Committee, however, recognized that the change from "opt-in" to
"opt-out" was somewhat innovative. Thus, the Committee added the
following special note in its 1964 proposed amendments: "The Advisory
Committee recognizes that the proposal embodied in subdivision ... (c)(2)
is novel. Accordingly, the Committee will particularly welcome comments
on this proposal. 24  The significance of the proposal did not escape the
attention of the legal community,25 which for the most part reacted favorably
at the time.
26
startling.") Landers further concludes that "[h]ad the full implications of rule 23 had been
realized in 1966, its passage in statutory form must be regarded as doubtful." Id.
22 Miller, supra app. note 4, at 670. Miller argued, however, that "most, if not the vast
majority, of the class actions instituted since 1966 would have entered the federal courts had
rule 23 not been altered." Id. at 676. See also Richard Posner, The Decline of Law as an
Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARv. L. REV. 761, 770 (commenting on the
"accidental growth of the class-action lawsuit, through a seemingly minor amendment to Rule
23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure..."). Cf. John Burritt McArthur, The Class
Action Tool in Qilfield Litigation, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 113, 185 n.433 (1996) (The opt-out
provision "guaranteed the large increase in class litigation" and that it is "unthinkable ... that
the Advisory Committee could have adopted that section [b(3)] without expecting a major
expansion of litigation.").
23 See, e.g., Thomas J. Weithers, Amended Rule 23: A Defendant's Point of View, 10 B.C.
INDUS. & COM. LREv. 515 (1969).
24 Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the U. S. District Courts Proposed by the
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 34 F.R.D. 371,395 (1964) (Special Note of Advisory
Committee). See also Kaplan, supra app. note 15, at 391 (describing the "opt out" provision
in (b)(3) and (c)(2) as "novel").
25 See, e.g., Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REV. 629, 642
(1965) ("The most significant change made by the proposed new rule is its provision that the
judgment in a class action based only on a common question of law or fact can operate
conclusively on all members of the class.").
26 See, e.g., Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Attacking the Party Problem, 38
S. CAL. L. REV. 80, 96 (1965) (describing the binding effect of the (b)(3) class action as
"[p]erhaps the most beneficial and far reaching change introduced by the proposed Rule 23").
It should be noted that the author of the above article was commenting upon the 1964
Preliminary Draft in which the right to opt out was not unqualified. The Preliminary Draft
stated that "[t]he court shall exclude those members who, by a date to be specified, request
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Charles Joiner, a member of the Committee, spoke approvingly of
Rule 23, especially of subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(2), stating that "persons are
protected to a much greater degree than under the present rule."27 Benjamin
Kaplan, as previously discussed, appeared to contend that the new opt-out
procedure was justified by the favorable effect it had on small claimants. 28
Additionally, Kaplan argued that "as a practical matter the new rule
is not a violent change injurious to the defendant," since under the previous
regime the courts had often avoided the liability-limiting "opt-in"
mechanism by allowing one-way interventions or classifying actions as
"true. ,29
In discussing the new opt-out rule, Judge Marvin Frankel remarked:
To a generation raised on Pennoyer v. Neff [citation omitted],
it is a rather heady and disturbing idea to be told that people
in faraway places who receive a letter or are 'described' in a
newspaper 'notice' which does not come to their attention are
exposed to a binding judgment unless they take some
affirmative action to exclude themselves ....
That reaction is entirely understandable, but I suggest,
with all deference, that our initial fears will prove in the end
to be largely unfounded.3 °
exclusion, unless the court finds that their exclusion is essential to the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy and states its reason therefor [sic]." Amendments to the
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts Proposed by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules, 34 F.R.D. 371, 386 (1964) (Proposed Rule 23(c)(2)). For an
argument that the Preliminary Draft of Rule 23(c)(2) was preferable to the Rule as adopted
in 1966, see Note, Revised Federal Rule 23, Class Actions: Surviving Difficulties and New
Problems Require Further Amendment, 52 MINN. L. REV. 483, 525-26 (1967).
For an opposing pre-enactment view of the opt-out scheme and the binding effect
of judgments in the proposed (b)(3) type class actions, see, e.g., Comm. on Fed. Rules of
Civil Procedure, Judicial Conference-Ninth Circuit, Supplemental Report, 37 F.R.D. 71,
82-83 (1965).
27 Charles Joiner, The New Civil Rules, A Substantial Improvement, 40 F.R.D. 359, 366-67
(1966).
28 See supra app. note 19 and accompanying text. See also Ford, supra app. note 18
(expressing the view that the underlying purpose of class actions is to redress small injuries
to a large number of persons).
29 Kaplan, supra app. note 15, at 397.
30 Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D.
39, 45 (1967). Frankel believed that if the "non-exhaustive list" of criteria of subdivision
(b)(3) were met, then "the preliminary shock of 'binding' absent people will subside or
disappear." Id. at 45-46. Additionally, he argued that it was "not really unprecedented" to
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The main objection to the new opt-out mechanism was that the (b)(3)
type action provided a device for bringing before the court "great numbers of
passive litigants who would otherwise have remained silent." 31 The inclusion
of these claimants in the judgment, so it was argued, would produce a direct
conflict with the professed purpose of subdivision (b)(3), economy of time,
expense, and effort.32 Indeed that has been the case.33 The opt-out change
to Rule 23 has resulted in a vast expansion of the number of class actions
brought.34 The expansion is in large measure a function of the power that
bind absentee members, pointing to the former "true" class action, in rem proceedings, and
stare decisis, which binds "countless people in lawsuits in which they did not participate."
Id. at 46. Frankel also remarked that the opt-out rule was limited, in that absent parties had
a right to attack the judgment which purported to bind them, for example, on the ground of
inadequacy of representation. Id. Moreover, the rule was limited by the fact that the
judgment was only conclusive on the issues actually litigated. Id. at 47.
31 See Weithers, supra app. note 23, at 525; See also William Simon, Class Actions- Useful
Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 377-78 (1972):
Failure to opt out cannot be interpreted as interest in the class action. This
is shown by the fact that in settled cases, where members of the class get
an automatic recovery by responding, most of those who do not opt out do
not bother to file claims. The result therefore is not the consolidation of
many viable claims in a single simplified lawsuit, but rather the generation
of claims for people who have no interest in pursuing them.
Id.
Several objections were made concerning the validity of the enactment of Rule 23.
One commentator argued that, by expressly stating the effect of a judgment in a class suit,
the Rule violated the Federal Rules Enabling Act, which provides that the Supreme Court
may prescribe rules of procedure for federal district courts but "shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right." See Note, supra app. note 17, at 1164-65 (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1958)). Another objection was that the Rule had the effect of extending jurisdiction
in contradiction to FED. R. Civ. P. 82, which provides that the rules "shall not be construed
to extend the jurisdiction of the United States district courts." See Sherman L. Cohn, The
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204, 1219-22 (1966). For a response
to the latter objection, see Kaplan, supra app. note 15, at 397.
32 Weithers, supra app. note 23, at 518. See also Simon supra app. note 31, at 377 (arguing
that courts which view the Rule as providing a remedy to small claimants "frustrate the
original goals of the intended reform" because "[i]nstead of improving efficiency, the
amendment has fostered a flood of class litigations").
33 In fact, by 1972 a prominent group of trial lawyers had concluded that Rule 23 had "failed
to achieve its purposes," and proposed six revisions of Rule 23, which included a return to
the former opt-in mechanism. See AM. COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 2, 6 (1972).
34 Evidence suggests that expansion of class action filings occurred shortly after the
promulgation of the 1966 amendments. Thus, a statistical study of civil dockets of federal
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certification of a class gives to lawyers for the class to effectively coerce a
settlement. Indeed, there was some sense at the time of the 1966
amendments that this would be the case. Although several undesirable results
of the approval of (b)(3) class actions were envisioned, in retrospect perhaps
the most accurate concern raised35 was that the aggregate amount of claims
in class actions would be of such magnitude that defendants would be forced
to settle the claims, regardless of the merits of the claims.
36
Other concerns raised about the (b)(3) class action included the
unlawful solicitation of clients by plaintiffs' attorneys and the crushing
economic and administrative burdens imposed upon the courts. 37 Another
concern typically raised involved the mechanical problems of the notice
requirement in subdivision (c)(2).38 For example, neither the Rule nor the
Committee's Notes clearly address the issues of who was required to prepare
and pay for the notice. If a plaintiff's attorney prepared and sent notice, the
ethical prohibition against client solicitation was a concern.39 Additionally,
if the plaintiff was to bear the cost of notice, "a requirement for certified
mailing to each member of a very large class may have a chilling, if not
prohibitive, effect on his prosecution of the class suit.
4 °
The drafters did not think that the opt-in/opt-out revision would have
an effect on mass torts. Indeed, they believed that the class action should not
apply to mass torts.41 Thus, the Advisory Committee's Note accompanying
courts in the Southern District of New York indicated that nearly four times as many class
actions were commenced in 1971 as were started in 1967, the first full year under the rule.
Id. at 13. See also DEBORAH HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CLASS
ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000); 1 CLASS ACTION
WATCH, Federalist Society's Litigation Practice Group Class Action Subcommittee at Al (a
survey of class actions pending in Texas state courts).
35 See, e.g., Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (likening the coercive effect to "legalized
blackmail").
36 Weithers, supra app. note 23, at 522. An unsigned memo provided to the Advisory
Committee in 1974 criticized amended Rule 23 because (b)(3) class actions "force
defendants into settlements regardless of the merits of the claims because the cost of defense
or the size of potential recovery is intimidating." See Resnik, supra app. note 8, at 16 n.45.
For a discussion of the coercive effects of the certification of class actions, see Section L.A
of main article.
37 Weithers, supra app. note 23, at 521-23.
38 See, e.g., Rodman Ward, Jr. & Wayne N. Elliot, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23
Notice, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 557 (1969).
39 Id. at 561-64.
40 Id. at 564-67.
41 Kaplan, supra app. note 15, at 393; see also Resnik, supra app. note 8, at 11 (The drafters
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Rule 23 (b)(3) stated:
A "mass accident" resulting in injuries to numerous persons
is ordinarily not appropriate for a class action because of the
likelihood that significant questions, not only of damages but
of liability and defenses to liability, would be present,
affecting the individuals in different ways. In these
circumstances an action conducted nominally as a class action
would degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits separately
tried.42
Some commentators and judges questioned the Advisory Committee's
note on mass torts within a few years of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 .
In 1972, a committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers
recommended a return to the opt-in procedure for (b)(3) classes, stating:
In the Committee's view, the current method for inclusion
and exclusion of class members, "patterned after the highly
successful procedures of the Book-of-the-Month Club" has
created more serious problems than it purported to resolve.
Contrary to the early predictions of the draftsmen that the
"opt-out" provision was not a "violent change injurious to the
defendant," this section of the amended rule has resulted in
the creation of the vast, silent and indefinite classes which are
only infrequently recognized as unmanageable and more
commonly utilized to compel settlement by defendants as a
of Rule 23 "did not see the class action as responsive to the problems of mass torts.");
William W. Schwarzer, Structuring Multiclaim Litigation: Should Rule 23 Be Revised?, 94
MICH. L. REV. 1250, 1253 (1996) ("One purpose the drafters did not have, however, was to
create a device for the aggregation of multiparty litigation. That type of litigation still lay
largely in the future.").
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 23, advisory committee's note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98-107 (1966). At least one
member of the Committee believed that mass torts should be absolutely excluded from
certification as a class action. See Resnik, supra app. note 8, at 10 (describing a letter from
John Frank to Benjamin Kaplan in which he writes, "I am, I believe, unpersuadably opposed
to the use of class actions in the mass tort situation").
In considering whether to certify mass torts as class actions some courts have noted
that the advisory committee's note does not mention or refer to mass torts, only "mass
accidents." See Patricia Rimland, National Asbestos Litigation: Procedural Problems Must
Be Solved, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 899, 903 n.35 (1991).
43 See Resnik, supra app. note 8, at 17 n.53.
3192001]
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
form of "ransom to be paid for total peace.""
Nonetheless, by the late 1970s, some federal district judges began
making a de facto revision to Rule 23(b)(3) by certifying mass torts as class
actions.45 By the early 1980s, one member of the Advisory Committee,
Charles Alan Wright, had become "profoundly convinced" that the
Committee's position on mass torts had been mistaken.46 It is clear that a
"profound" change has occurred in the use of class actions in mass torts since
the 1966 amendments to Rule 23. While historically the certification of
class actions in the case of mass torts was disfavored, increasingly courts
have approved such certification. But for the amendments, moreover, more
specifically the adoption of the opt-out mechanism in subdivision (b)(3), the
considerable increase in the certification of mass torts could not have
occurred as it did.48 Yet the Advisory Committee, as noted above,
44AM. COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL
COMMrrTEE ON RuLE 23 APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF REGENTS 32 (1972) (citations
omitted).
45Id. at 17-19. See Bruce H. Neilson, Was the 1966 Advisory Committee Right?. Suggested
Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation,
25 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 461 (1988) (describing several techniques developed by federal
district court judges to allow class actions in mass tort cases). Interestingly, Justice Hugo
Black dissented from the adoption of the 1966 amendments because, inter alia, he thought
that judges were given too much discretion in class suits. 39 F.R.D. 272, 274 (1967) (Mr.
Justice Black's Statement). Of course, many judges declined to certify mass torts as class
actions in accordance with the constraints suggested by the advisory committee's note. For
a surnrary of some of these decisions, see Richard A. Chesley & Kathleen Woods Kolodgy,
Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 U. GIN. L. REV. 467,
485-90 (1985).
46 Wright stated:
I was an ex officio member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
when Rule 23 was amended, which came out with an Advisory Committee
Note saying that mass torts are inappropriate for class certification. I
thought then that was true. I am profoundly convinced now that this is
untrue. Unless we can use the class action and devices built on the class
action, our judicial system is simply not going to be able to cope with the
challenge of the mass repetitive wrong that we see in this case and so
many others.
In re A.H. Robbins Co., 880 F.2d. 709, 731 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Statement of Charles
Alan Wright, In Re School Asbestos Litigation, Master File No. 83-0286 (E.D. Pa. July 30,
1984)).
47See Resnik, supra app. note 8, at 21.
48 While Arthur Miller has argued that Rule 23 cannot be blamed for the explosion of class
action litigation in the fields of civil rights, antitrust, consumers' rights, and environmental
protection, it is interesting to note that he did not explicitly address mass tort litigation. See
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discouraged the use of Rule 23(b)(3) for mass torts; it is thus highly likely
that the resultant substantial growth of class action litigation in mass torts
was simply an unintended, unforeseen consequence of the change to the opt-
out mechanism. 49 So too, though perhaps to a lesser extent, is the explosive
growth of class actions in the consumer fraud area.
With the recognition that the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 have
precipitated unforeseen and unintended changes, renewed efforts to again
amend Rule 23 have gained momentum. 50 One of the principal objectives of
the proponents of change is to return to a modified form of the opt-in
procedure. In this regard, a Judicial Conference committee chair offered the
following:
I believe that Rule 23 was never intended to be a tool to
enhance enforcement of substantive claims. Rather, I believe,
it was designed as a procedural device to facilitate the
aggregation of claims for judicial efficiency. Others,
however, believe that while judicial efficiency may have been
the original intent of Rule 23, the rule has transformed by use
into a mechanism to enhance substantive enforcement with
the result that it actually supplements or even displaces
government regulation. While there is plenty of evidence to
support this observation, if it were to be legitimized as a
purpose for Rule 23, such legitimization should, in my
judgment, be effected by Congress, and Congress might well
conclude that it is too anarchical to authorize private attorneys
text accompanying supra app. note 22. Regarding the new opt-out mechanism, Miller stated:
It is true of course that the shift from an opt-in to an opt-out procedure has
heightened the attractiveness of seeking damages under the federal
antitrust and securities laws. The effect is to facilitate the aggregation of
relatively small claims that are not individually economically viable into
a group claim that is sufficiently credible to be taken seriously. It is
difficult to believe, however, that an alternative procedure for achieving
the same result would not have been developed by plaintiffs had they been
left with the pre-1966 text.
Miller, supra app. note 4, at 674.
49 For an argument that the change to opt-out is unconstitutional in at least some applications,
see Stephen J. Safranek, Do Class Action Plaintiffs Lose Their Constitutional Rights?, 1996
Wis. L. REV. 263 (1996).
50 See generally Edward H. Cooper, The (Cloudy) Future of Class Actions, 40 ARIz. L. REV.
923 (1998); Leslie W. O'Leary, Mass Tort Class Actions: Will Amchem Spawn Creative
Solutions?, 65 DEF. CouNs. J. 469 (1998); Thomas E. Willging et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis
of Rule 23 To Address The Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (1996).
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to self-appoint themselves as enforcers of laws without
adequate accountability to the lawmakers or to the public.5'
Another set of efforts is directed against abusive practices of plaintiff
lawyers bringing class actions in state courts and using subterfuges to prevent
removal of the action to federal court. 52
Whether any of these efforts will succeed in the face of opposition
from both the class action bar-amply fueled by the enormous fees generated
by such litigation-and consumer groups with which the plaintiffs' bar is
typically allied, remains to be seen.
Statement on Class Actions Before the Courts and Intellectual Property Subcomm. of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 5, 1998, 105th Cong. (statement of John P. Frank)
(quoting Judge Paul Niemeyer, before the Senate Judiciary Comm., Dec. 16, 1997), available
at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/41158.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2001). Mr. Frank, a
member of the Civil Rules Committee at the time of the 1966 Amendment, sets forth several
recommendations in his testimony to deal with the excesses that the amendments have
spawned. Id.
5 See John H. Beisner, "Congressional Reform Efforts," reference materials for use in a
presentation at "Understanding Class Actions," a conference of the Manhattan Institute's
Center for Judicial Studies, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1998, (on file with author) for a
compendium of materials on H.1K 3789, 105th Cong. (1998). The bill would allow removal
of class actions filed in'state courts to federal courts in some instances not now permitted to
combat such abusive practices of plaintiffs' class action counsel as: adding a defendant to
a state court class action proceeding to destroy "complete diversity" and then, after the one
year period for removal to federal court, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (2002), has expired, dropping
that defendant; limiting the relief demanded in a state court class action to avoid removal to
federal court because of the class amount, see Zahn v. Int'l Paper, 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (in
a putative class action, the jurisdictional amount requirement-now $75,000-applies to the
claims of each and every class member, and then after the one year period for removal has
expired, amending the complaint to seek relief in excess of the diversity jurisdictional amount
threshold; and filing putative class actions in state court in states that have no deadline for
providing service and then not serving the defendant until the one year deadline has expired).
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